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ABSTRACT
Past justifications of free expression rely on the crucial role speech
plays in deliberative democracies and respecting persons. Beneath each of
these justifications lies the common goal of creating greater justice for
individuals and groups. Yet 20th century political liberalism limits the
kinds of arguments that ought to motivate political decisions. In this paper
I explore how an inclusive political decision-making process can bring
about a more just world. By relying on personal views and compassion
rather than impartiality and reasonability, political actors can engage in a
discourse that results in greater understanding among persons and lasting
community change.
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Introduction
god help me im throwing my neighbor off a building
- S. Roggenbuck

Fall of my freshman year at Macalester College my class had the honor of having
a world-class humanitarian speak at our convocation. I don’t remember a word of what
he said. What I do remember from that crisp September evening is a speech given by
then student body President Owen Truesdell. Just returning to campus from a semester
abroad, Truesdell spent the previous year meeting new people and working to stay in
touch with a group of friends scattered across the globe. With that experience fresh on
his mind, Truesdell delivered a speech on the meaning of global citizenship—a topic
frequently discussed at Macalester. ‘Macalester tries to make us good communicators,’
Truesdell said, ‘and for the most part, they succeed. While I was abroad I spoke to
people from other cultures, countries, and communities with ease. But when it came to
talking to the other American students on my program, I struggled.’
Truesdell’s speech went on to question whether Macalester’s attempt to create
good communicators is successful. Though Macalester teaches students to communicate
with people from a wide range of backgrounds, Truesdell claimed, the same care is not
taken to ensure students graduate with the ability to engage with people whose
viewpoints do not accord with their own. Instead, Truesdell, and others like him,
graduate into a world where they do not possess the skills to have meaningful
conversations with people who adhere to disparate ideologies.
4

What follows is not a critique of Macalester College or its educational
environment. Yet Macalester’s primacy in shaping my experiences over the past four
years prompted me to use the college in examples sprinkled throughout this paper.
Macalester’s tendency to produce individuals who might only see a specific subset of
ideologies as attention-worthy in political discourse reflects a broader theme in political
liberalism—a theme central to this paper. Political liberalism, as characterized by John
Rawls, divides political ideologies into two categories: reasonable and unreasonable.
While various reasonable views are seen as valuable in political discourse and decisionmaking processes, unreasonable views ought to be disregarded in these contexts.
Upon first glance, this dichotomy between reasonable and unreasonable views
seems constructive. Our intuition might tell us that only reasonable views provide
normatively valuable political reasons. But what does it mean for something to be
reasonable? And where, exactly, might this intuition come from?
Though separating reasonable arguments from unreasonable ones may seem
intuitive, I claim Rawlsian reasonability stifles our ability to bring about a more just
world. To defend this view, I begin by addressing John Rawls’s conception of
reasonability. Here I work within Rawls’s ideal theory to illustrate how political
reasonability, as a constraint on political decision-making, is not sufficient to bring about
adequately just outcomes. I then critique reasonable public spheres as alienating and
ineffective in fostering genuine understanding among citizens—even reasonable ones.
Next I draw on alternate paradigms of discourse and decision-making that might be used
in lieu of Rawls’s reasonable public sphere and how we might decide what is just within
5

alternate paradigms. I build on these models by asserting that political actors ought to
reason with each other on the basis of personal views and compassion rather than
attempting to be impartial.
Ultimately I conclude that we ought to strive for a public political sphere that
eliminates Rawls’s dichotomy between reasonable and unreasonable views. An
uninhibited public sphere, I claim, allows for greater respect and understanding among
persons. Respectful deliberation allows all involved persons to feel valued and heard
while laying the groundwork for effective cross-cultural change. In this way, I claim that
freely expressing one’s views ought to be valued not only for its role in deliberative
processes or respecting persons, but as a tool to bring about a more just world.
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1. The (Im)Partiality of the Public Sphere:
A Critique of Rawlsian Reasonability
MY DAY HASN’T
BEEN TOO GREAT
BUT NOW IT IS.
THE DEMOCRATS
NOW CONTROL
CONGRESS
- S. Roggenbuck

‘If anyone here has religious views about the nature of evil, I’d like to hear them.’
After a student in my discussion-based English class invited religious students to voice
their theological opinions about our topic for the day, students coming from religious
backgrounds were still reluctant to speak up. When our professor asked why they hadn’t
talked about their religious views before, my peers responded that they did not want to
make arguments other students couldn’t identify with. Rather than speak out, students
with religious views censored themselves; presenting only a fraction of their thoughts for
fear of putting their personal views into what they thought ought to be an impartial realm
of academic discourse.
Discussions in the humanities at Macalester College are not necessarily
representative of discussions that occur in the public political sphere. Yet the selfcensoring that occurred in this conversation in my English class bears a striking
resemblance to the manner in which proponents of political liberalism tend to distinguish
attention-worthy political arguments from those we ought to ignore. If everyone can
potentially identify with or affirm a position, political liberals claim it is fair game for the
7

public political sphere. If an argument is too personal, however, it ought not to be taken
seriously in public discourse.
In this chapter I explore how the public sphere functions in Rawlsian thought. I
describe how John Rawls attempts to provide for a stable, ideologically diverse politics
through what he calls ‘reasonable overlapping consensus’. Following this account I
examine reasonability in closer detail. I question Rawls’s claim that the political
conception of justice and the reasonable realm it constitutes are impartial to specific
conceptions of the good.1 Following this analysis I take a closer look at the origins of
Rawls’s political conception of justice and what, exactly, makes it reasonable. I conclude
that individuals with political power use their conceptions of the good to determine what
is reasonable in a society. Due to the constitutive force of politically powerful ideologies,
Rawls’s political project is not impartial or non-coercive in the way he hopes. In this
way, Rawls’s constraints on political decision-making are not sufficient to bring about
just outcomes on Rawls’s own terms. Critiquing Rawls’s division between reasonable
and unreasonable views is the first step in my defense of an uninhibited public political
sphere based on personal views and compassion rather than impartiality and
reasonability.
I. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE & ITS DEMANDS ON THE PUBLIC POLITICAL
SPHERE
John Rawls’s political project aims to create a peaceful pluralism. But the kind of
ideological pluralism Rawls envisions is not a thin conception of minor differences of
1

In the context of this paper I use the word ‘partial’ to denote the presence of bias or a tendency
to value one view over another. I use the word ‘impartial’ to refer to a lack of such bias.
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opinions between individuals. In fact, Rawls wants citizens living under a just
government to possess “profound and irreconcilable differences in...[their] reasonable
comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions of the world, and in their views
of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought in human life” (Restatement 3). A
Rawlsian society allows for a wide variety of conceptions of the good to flourish
(Restatement 18, Peoples 55).
When Rawls discusses notions of the good in his political philosophy he refers to
these views as ‘comprehensive doctrines’. According to Rawls, comprehensive doctrines
are “comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines in light of which [an
individual’s]...ends and aims are ordered and understood” (Restatement 19).2 As this
quote illustrates, any philosophical or moral doctrine can be a comprehensive doctrine,
from religious views to secular ones. All that is important to qualify a doctrine as
comprehensive is its ability to provide a normative guide for a person’s life.
To Rawls, a society that includes so many competing conceptions of the good
seems prone to political instability. When formulating his conception of justice Rawls
hopes to address this instability by focusing on how pluralistic societies can be both free
and cooperative (Peoples 29). Yet Rawls is not interested in political stability at any
cost. Rawls’s commitment to pluralism means that Rawls is interested in political
stability without ideological coercion. Rawls’s aversion to ideological coercion is not
limited to respect for persons’ comprehensive doctrines. According to Rawls, forcing
2

When comprehensive doctrines first appear in Rawls’s work, Rawls claims they must be
“comprehensive and coherent” and offer a “ranking of values” (Liberalism 58-9). Yet in his latest
work Rawls states that comprehensive doctrines can be partial, plural, and fluid (Restatement
193). The less than comprehensive, changing nature of comprehensive doctrines will be taken
up later in this chapter.
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citizens to affirm a specific set of views will lead to widespread political unrest, unless
the society is sufficiently skillful in quenching rebellion. Due to these considerations,
Rawls concludes society must be “stable for the right reasons” (Peoples 29). By the
‘right reasons’ Rawls means that the stability of a just society ought to be founded on
ideas that do not favor one comprehensive doctrine over another. These ideas must be
able to “be publicly seen to be sound” by all citizens (Liberalism 162). By providing for
an impartial political notion of justice Rawls hopes to avoid both political instability and
undue coercion.
Rawls must create a political conception of justice that can be supported by a
wide variety of comprehensive doctrines while simultaneously remaining impartial to
each comprehensive doctrine. In order to do this, Rawls suggests that “in public reason
comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens” (Peoples 132). Rawls asks persons to set
aside the parts of their views that are not supportable by others’ views when discussing
political matters. Instead, persons must discuss political matters with reference to what
Rawls calls the political conception of justice.
Rawls devises three criteria a political conception of justice must meet:
1. The conception’s principles are limited to the basic structure of society
2. The conception can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of
any kind
3. The conception is drawn from fundamental ideas implicit in the political culture
of a constitutional regime (Restatement 33; Peoples 143)
In his work on Rawlsian public reason, Richard Amesbury succinctly describes Rawlsian
justice as “tradition-impartial but not tradition-independent” (Amesbury 587). In the
10

above criteria Rawls largely provides for the tradition-impartial aspect of the relationship
between the political and comprehensive doctrines. While comprehensive doctrines
come from a specific philosophical, moral, or religious tradition, the political conception
of justice can be presented independent of these traditions. Instead of relying on
comprehensive doctrines or the traditions they come from, the political conception of
justice originates in the fundamental political ideas of a society.
Yet the political conception of justice does not always stand on its own. If the
political conception of justice is completely tradition-independent, Rawls is left without a
thick, pluralistic way for citizens to endorse the political conception of justice. When
Amesbury states that Rawls’s political conception of justice is not tradition-independent
he means that the Rawlsian notion of justice can be supported by a broad range of
comprehensive doctrines. The ideas individuals express in the public political sphere
must be consistent with their comprehensive doctrines, though citizens ought to discuss
these ideas according to the purely political standards Rawls sets out in the passage
above. By creating an impartial public political sphere Rawls hopes to solve problems
stemming from open pluralism by providing for a pluralistic society that respects
individual liberty and remains stable over time.
II. REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
Rawls sees himself as creating a political conception of justice that can be
supported by a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines. Yet Rawls realizes that not all
comprehensive doctrines will be consistent with the political conception of justice.
Recognizing this, Rawls distinguishes between reasonable comprehensive doctrines and
11

merely rational ones. In his “What is reasonableness?” James Boettcher states
“reasonableness [as opposed to rationality] requires justificability from the common point
of view” (614). A reasonable comprehensive doctrine can be seen to be reasonable from
a wide range of other perspectives. A rational comprehensive doctrine, on the other
hand, does not necessarily have any universal or commonly intelligible quality.
The difference between reasonability and rationality corresponds to Rawls’s two moral
powers of persons. According to Rawls, persons’ capacity for a conception of justice is
distinct from their capacity for a conception of the good. A person’s capacity for justice
“is a capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (not merely in accordance with) the
principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation” (Restatement 18).
The reasonable capacity of a person seeks to cooperate with others under just rules that
govern society, as long as others do so as well.
A person’s rational capacity, on the other hand, merely compels persons to
intelligently pursue their own interests in accordance with their conception of the good.
In contrast with reasonableness, rationality is consistent with egoism (Restatement 7,
“(Un)Reasonablness” 311). When a person’s rational interests align with their society’s
fair terms of political cooperation, Rawls would call them reasonable. Rawls would also
consider persons who allow their reasonable motivations to override their rational ones
reasonable (Peoples 173). When a person’s rational interests are not consistent with their
society’s fair terms of political cooperation, however, they are not considered reasonable
on Rawls’s view.
According to this interpretation, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one that
12

can support the political conception of justice. An unreasonable comprehensive doctrine,
though rational, cannot support the political conception of justice. Rawls explains the
difference between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines with the
following: “a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one in which they [political values
of justice] are not overridden; it is the unreasonable doctrines in which reasonable
political values are overridden” (Peoples 173). Here Rawls defines a comprehensive
doctrine’s reasonability in terms of its subordination to the political conception of
justice.3
Yet how do reasonable comprehensive doctrines support the political conception
of justice? Recall that Rawls’s political conception of justice is tradition-impartial but
not tradition-independent. We have already seen that the political conception of justice
must be supportable by a wide range of comprehensive doctrines. More than that,
however, the political conception of justice is constituted by the common ground shared
between all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls calls this common ground
reasonable overlapping consensus (Restatement 32).

3

Whether subordination is a satisfactory support in Rawls’s framework will be taken up later in
this chapter.
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I imagine Rawls’s idea of
overlapping consensus looks like Figure
1. In Figure 1, each circle marked rCD
represents a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine. Each of these reasonable
comprehensive doctrines are separate,
though they overlap in various ways.
ways The
intersection of the circles, marked rJ,
represents the political conception of
justice. The shape rJ is constituted by the
overlapping circles in the diagram. rJ could, however, be lifted out of Figure 1 and
presented on its own. These shapes fu
function
nction in much the same way as Rawls’s political
conception of justice. The political conception of justice is supported by reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, though it can also be presented independent of these doctrines.
The values embodied in the pol
political
itical conception of justice are part of every reasonable
comprehensive doctrine. In this way Rawlsian justice does not favor any one
comprehensive doctrine over another and may be interpreted as impartial.
The same applies to the Rawlsian public sphere. According to Rawls, citizens
ought to replace their particular conceptions of the good with an idea of the politically
reasonable, addressed to citizens as citizens, when they talk about political matters. The
content of the ‘politically reasonable addr
addressed
essed to citizens as citizens’ consists of the
fundamental principles outlined in the political conception of justice. In the Rawlsian
14

public sphere, citizens can only base their reasons for, and justifications of, political
arguments on these fundamental principles (Peoples 132). Of course citizens can
privately support their political arguments through their comprehensive doctrines. But, in
the public sphere, citizens can only talk about their comprehensive doctrines to express to
others how their comprehensive doctrine is reasonable, or how it supports the political
conception (Peoples 153-4). By limiting political discussions to the politically
reasonable, Rawls thinks citizens can discuss politics on terms everyone can accept,
preserving pluralism while avoiding instability.
Overlapping consensus also insures that citizens are not coerced into accepting
the political conception of justice. Reasonable people already affirm the values
embodied in the political conception of justice, so there is no reason for politicians to
coerce reasonable citizens into accepting the political conception. The same applies to
the public sphere. In a Rawlsian society, citizens publicly present their views in terms of
the political conception of justice even if they consider other parts of their comprehensive
doctrine as the ‘real’ reason they hold a political view (Peoples 176). For example, a
Christian may ultimately disagree with abortion based on their particular religious beliefs.
In a Rawlsian society, this individual ought to defend their view against abortion by
relying on a generally acceptable principle such as persons’ right to life when conversing
with others in the public sphere. Yet, citizens are not coerced into presenting their
political views in terms they do not agree with because they already affirm the principles
of justice from within their comprehensive doctrine.
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Unreasonable comprehensive doctrines do not play a part in constituting the
political conception of justice and do not have a place in the public sphere. If added into
Figure 1, an unreasonable comprehensive doctrine could have places of overlap with a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine, or even the reasonable conception of justice. An
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine could not, however, fully overlap with shape rJ, the
reasonable conception of justice. For example, fundamentalist Christian views may share
many ideas with the reasonable conception of justice. Yet sexist or homophobic views
may prevent a fundamentalist Christian from fully supporting the political conception of
justice. Rawls’s rationale behind seeking to exclude unreasonable doctrines makes most
sense in the context of public reason. In a Rawlsian society, unreasonable views ought
not to be expressed in the public sphere due to others’ inability to accept those views
from within their reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Peoples 132).
Rawls’s reasonable overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
plays a critical role in his philosophy. Without the reasonable overlapping consensus,
Rawls cannot have both impartial respect for pluralism and non-coercive stability, each
of which he sees as central to a just regime.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF REASONABILITY & (IM)PARTIALITY
Reasonability is the basis for nearly all of the significant concepts in Rawlsian
justice. In “The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality” (2005), Shaun Young
illuminates the reasonability’s centrality in Rawlsian thought with the following:
In essence then, Rawlsian political liberalism is concerned to offer a reasonable public
conception of justice that can accommodate the demands of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines and reasonable disagreement and, subsequently, provide a basis for a
16

reasonable overlapping consensus on a single conception of justice to regulate society’s
public realm. (312)
Without a working definition of the reasonable, deciphering the substantive claims made
in this synopsis of Rawls’s view is absurd.
If Rawls’s work is any indication, however, it may not be necessary to thoroughly
define reasonability. Martha Nussbaum seems to take this view. Nussbuam, though a
Rawlsian, is not troubled by reasonability’s slipperiness. When it comes to the applying
reasonability to comprehensive doctrines, Nussbaum states, “readers must sort this out
for themselves” (“Reassessment” 7).
Taking Nussbaum’s charge at face value, I attempt to sort out Rawlsian
reasonability. First I try to make sense of political reasonability by unraveling the
relationship between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice.
Next, I explore how citizens may change from unreasonable to reasonable over time. In
the course of these analyses I assert that the politically reasonable is not impartial or noncoercive in the way Rawls intends. Ultimately I conclude that political reasonability is a
source of unintentional hegemonic bias in Rawls’s conception of justice and does not
necessarily provide a strong foundation for the kind of political decision-making Rawls
hopes for.
III.1 (IM)PARTIALITY & REASONABLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES
In Political Liberalism Rawls treated comprehensive doctrines as singular, allencompassing notions of the good that guide individuals lives and provide them with a
“ranking of values” (Liberalism 58-9). For example, according to this early view, an
17

individual’s comprehensive doctrine may be some form of Christianity that gives her a
conception of the good and a system of values with which to order her life. Modern
people, however, tend to affirm a number of competing doctrines, not just one. For
example, maybe this same person began her life with just one comprehensive doctrine—
Presbyterian Christianity. Yet as she grew and went to college she encountered a number
of other views she found appealing from Tibetan Buddhism to nihilism to a spiritual
physiology involving tantric energy winds. All of these doctrines inform how this person
might think of herself, ranks her values, and guides her life.
Rawls realized modern individuals are complex in this manner. So, in his later
work, Rawls asserted that comprehensive doctrines can be partial, plural, fluid, and even
contradictory. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement Rawls claims: “Most people’s
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines are not seen by them as fully general and
comprehensive; generality and comprehensiveness admit of degree, and so does the
extent to which a view is articulated and systematic” (Restatement 193).
Instead of one comprehensive doctrine, most people have many partially
comprehensive doctrines. Some of these doctrines, such as Presbyterianism and Tibetan
Buddhism in the example above, might be consistent with the fundamental principles of
political reasonability. Other doctrines like nihilism and tantra might clash with the
politically reasonable due to their extreme emphasis on individual persons. Rawls would
consider the doctrines that align or overlap with the fundamental principles of justice
reasonable, while he would consider any doctrine that does not match up with the
political conception of justice unreasonable.
18

A charitable interpretation of Rawls indicates that only one reasonable
comprehensive doctrine is necessary for an individual to participate in reasonable
overlapping consensus or to offer reasonable political thoughts in the public sphere.
Though a person with a mix of reasonable and unreasonable doctrines may have
unreasonable thoughts or inclinations, they still have the ability to ground their
conception of justice and political views in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine.
Yet in Rawls’s practical theory, political reasonability does not come from
overlapping consensus alone. Rather the political conception of justice, from which the
politically reasonable is derived, is drawn from fundamental ideas implicit in the political
culture of a constitutional regime (Restatement 33; Peoples 143). For Rawls these
fundamental ideas might be concepts like fairness, equality, and basic human rights.
Fundamental ideas, in turn, come from societal institutions like the constitution, Supreme
Court decisions, laws, or historical texts like the Federalist Papers (Theory 6). From
institutions and fundamental ideas, citizens come in contact with the reasonable political
conception of justice by encountering it in their everyday life (Restatement 192). Just as
the political conception of justice comes from these fundamentals, so too do citizens’
affinity for them. Citizens might encounter the political conception of justice in a variety
of contexts from education to taking part in the political process to other forms of
socialization.
For many citizens, the political conception of justice will align well with their
comprehensive doctrine or partially comprehensive doctrines. Yet for some, the political
conception of justice and political reasonability will not match up with their other
19

doctrines at all. According to Rawls, it is possible for these individuals to affirm the
political conception of justice all on its own by appreciating “the public good it
accomplishes in a democratic society” (Theory 193). There the political conception of
justices is not supported by a given person’s comprehensive doctrines whatsoever. In this
situation, the political conception of justice functions as a partially comprehensive
doctrine.
Recall Rawls’s three requirements for the political conception of justice. Recall
how the political conception of justice must be able to be presented independent of
comprehensive doctrines of any kind (Restatement 33; Peoples 143). Rawls’s assertion
that the political conception of justice must be impartial to comprehensive doctrines
occurs in texts where Rawls also acknowledges the partial, fluid nature of comprehensive
doctrines. Given that these two claims appear together in two separate texts, I take
Rawls’s claim that the political conception of justice must be able to be presented
independent of comprehensive doctrines of any kind to mean that the political conception
of justice must be able to be presented independent of any one partially comprehensive
doctrines as well as fully comprehensive doctrines. Yet, when the political conception of
justice stands on its own, it is a partially comprehensive doctrine.
In The Law of Peoples Rawls states: “The fact of reasonable pluralism implies
that there is no such doctrine, whether fully or partially comprehensive, on which all
citizens do or can agree to settle the fundamental questions of political justice” (Peoples
148). Rawls’s assertion that citizens ought not to agree on any fully or partially
comprehensive doctrine reinforces my view that the political conception of justice cannot
20

and ought not to be a partially comprehensive doctrine according to Rawlsian thought.4
Here Rawls’s assertion that the political conception of justice cannot be a partially
comprehensive doctrine contradicts his statement that the political conception of justice
can be affirmed without the support of other doctrines.
Rawls may attempt to remedy this contradiction by asserting that the political
conception of justice’s principles are restricted to the basic structure of society
(Restatement 33; Peoples 143). However, partially comprehensive doctrines do not offer
all-encompassing worldviews that provide for a complete ranking of a person’s values.
Given that the political conception of justice can be affirmed without the support of other
doctrines, and that partially comprehensive doctrines do not necessarily provide a full
ranking of a person’s values, Rawls’s likely assertion that the political conception of
justice is too narrow to be a partially comprehensive doctrine does not resolve my
objection.
If I am correct in interpreting Rawls’s work as stating that the political conception
of justice cannot be a partially comprehensive doctrine, my assertion that the political
conception of justice can be a partially comprehensive doctrine presents a problem for
Rawls. If the political conception of justice is a partially comprehensive doctrine,
Rawls’s notion of justice cannot be presented independent of comprehensive doctrines of
any kind. Though it is not exactly clear what Rawls means by saying that the political
conception of justice must have the ability to be presented independent of comprehensive

4

The claim that the political conception of justice cannot be a partially comprehensive doctrine is
central to the rest of my analysis. If the reader finds this claim unacceptable, they will likely find a
great deal of what follows an unacceptable or invalid critique of Rawls’s work.
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doctrines of any kind, we can agree that if the political conception of justice is a partially
comprehensive doctrine, it cannot be presented independent of itself. On my
interpretation, Rawls has failed his own standards of impartiality: the political
conception of justice is partial to a particular partially comprehensive doctrine—namely
the political conception of justice itself.
III.2 (IM)PARTIALITY, COERCION & POLITICAL CULTURE
Rawls may respond to my assertion that the political conception of justice is a
partially comprehensive doctrine by stating that the political conception of justice’s role
as a partially comprehensive doctrine is merely temporary. According to Rawls, when
the political conception of justice is incompatible with a citizen’s doctrines, the citizen
“might very well adjust or revise the latter rather than reject the political conception”
(Restatement 193). In fact, once a political conception gains legitimacy in a society,
Rawls believes it is more likely citizens will adjust or revise their doctrines than reject the
political conception (Restatement 193).
After a citizen's doctrines become reasonable to match the political conception of
justice, their comprehensive or partially comprehensive doctrines can participate in the
overlapping consensus that supports the political conception of justice. Once a citizen
can participate in overlapping consensus through the support of doctrines other than the
political conception of justice, the political conception of justice will merely be a portion
of other reasonable doctrines. For Rawls, a person may not be reasonable until this
transformation of doctrines occurs. If a person is not reasonable until they have more
doctrines than the political conception of justice that support the political conception of
22

justice, the political conception of justice never has to be the comprehensive doctrine
whose support of the political conception of justice makes a person reasonable.
Yet the political conception of justice’s merely temporary function as a partially
comprehensive doctrine does not change the fact that the political conception of justice
can be a partially comprehensive doctrine. Moreover the reasonable-ization of a person’s
doctrines constitutes a subtle coercion of that person’s ideologies. Citizens’ doctrines
become reasonable through contact with politically legitimated notions of reasonability.
Recall that Rawls thinks citizens will be more likely to affirm doctrines that gain
legitimacy in a society. Through this process of reasonable-ization, those with political
power shape the views of the citizens they govern due to the self-legitimation that
accompanies political power. Rather than an overlapping consensus of reasonable
persons determining what is politically reasonable, political power structures legitimate
their own conceptions of justice because they are powerful and normalized.
Rawls would likely respond that there is nothing wrong with citizens becoming more
reasonable over time. For Rawls, reasonability means agreeing with his conception of
justice. If subtle coercion occurs on the way to a citizen becoming reasonable, that
coercion was for their own good and the good of society.
But what if the legitimate political conception of justice in a society is not a
conception Rawls would consider reasonable? Imagine, for example, the Nazi regime in
Germany in World War II. Rawls would doubtlessly consider Nazism unreasonable. In
Nazi Germany, however, a Nazi conception of justice would be ‘reasonable’ in that it
may be derived from the fundamental ideas of a regime based on its political culture.
23

One can even imagine an overlapping consensus of unreasonable doctrines that might
support an unreasonable conception of justice such as Nazism. I imagine that from a
Rawlsian perspective, unreasonable conceptions do not pose a problem to Rawls’s view.
If an unreasonable notion of reasonability gains legitimacy in a society, a reasonable
person will simply reject it and remain reasonable.
Yet there is nothing to guarantee that the kind of subtle coercion that occurs when
a reasonable conception of justice gains societal legitimacy will not occur when an
unreasonable conception of justice is in a position of political power. Even if the
Rawlsian reasonable person were to resist the subtle ideological coercion that occurs
when an idea gains legitimacy in a society, they would be discouraged from expressing
their dissent if the unreasonable society they lived in adhered to the idea of the Rawlsian
public sphere. The reasonable person would only be encouraged to publicly express
themselves on the politically unreasonable grounds designated by an unreasonable
overlapping consensus. Even if the reasonable person were to express their views in an
unreasonable society, they would likely be dismissed by the hegemonic majority.
Rawls would certainly not approve of a society where citizens could only express
themselves within the bounds of an unreasonable overlapping consensus. In an
unreasonable society, Rawls would likely not advocate for a public sphere where citizens
put aside their comprehensive doctrines and converse only on the basis of the politically
reasonable (Peoples 132). Instead, Rawls would want reasonable people to express their
views despite the fact that those around them might not accept their reasons to be true.
Unfortunately, there is nothing inherent in Rawls’s notion of reasonability that
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prevents an unreasonable conception of justice from ruling a society. Speaking in a
practical sense,5 political cultures can be unreasonable, fundamental ideas can be
unreasonable, and overlapping consensus can be unreasonable. Given the lack of
inherent legitimacy in Rawlsian reasonability, there is no reason why citizens ought to
value putting their comprehensive doctrines aside to engage in purely ‘reasonable’
discourse in the public sphere. In fact, it seems that the only reason to put comprehensive
doctrines aside at all is to accord with what those in power deem to be satisfactory
political reasoning. Ultimately, the politically reasonable is a source of unintentional
hegemonic bias rather than impartiality in Rawls’s political project.
IV. POWER CONSTITUTES THE PUBLIC SPHERE
According to Rawls, public reason ought to be restricted to purely political
conversations, particularly conversations between judges and politicians. Though I
disagree with Rawls’s restrictive view of political discourse, let us assume for the sake of
argument that Rawls’s exclusion of persons’ comprehensive doctrines in these contexts is
acceptable. On Rawls’s view, “The idea of public reason does not apply to background
culture with its many forms of non-public reason nor to media of any kind” (Peoples
134). Conceivably, if a reasonable person finds themselves in an unreasonable society
they can simply speak out against political power structures in the public political sphere,
gathering support and eventually overturning those in power. Restricting public reason to
the basic structure of society may allow Rawls to justify public reason’s exclusivity. The
revolution would likely be more expedient, however, if dissenting views were seen as
5

Dealing specifically with Rawls’s more practical philosophy, not his thought experiment behind
the veil of ignorance
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legitimate in political conversations.
Furthermore, political notions of reasonability do not apply exclusively to
political conversations. Take, for example, the scenario that opened this paper.
Religious students in that classroom self-censored their views about the nature of evil
because they were afraid their peers could not accept their arguments. In short, those
students felt their thoughts were unreasonable in a Rawlsian sense. Evidence of the
pervasive force of reasonability abounds in contemporary culture in the United States.
From the courtroom to the media to the classroom, political reasonability shapes how
individuals communicate with each other in all forms of public life. Just as political
power gives the reasonable conception of justice legitimacy, it also legitimates what
constitutes a valid form of discourse. Not only is political reasonability not necessarily
reasonable, it is not necessarily political.
Social psychologist Dominic J. Packer’s work substantiates these claims.
According to Packer, individuals strive to behave in a way that is consistent with the ideal
person in their in-group (Packer 52). Where an in-group is constituted by liberal values,
individuals will likely strive to embody Rawlsian reasonability in all kinds of
conversations and decision making processes, not just purely political ones. Rawlsian
reasonability effects conversations that occur in a society’s background political culture,
not just its purely political institutions.
Reasonability’s lack of inherent normative appeal and its effects on broader
culture have serious implications for whether we ought to pursue a public political sphere
that only values reasonable arguments. If disregarding unreasonable views is analogous
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to disregarding views not supported by those in power, we ought to question reasonability
as a criterion for a good political argument. Similarly, if a reasonable public political
sphere discourages citizens from engaging with each other’s comprehensive doctrines
outside the political realm, we ought to be weary of reasonability’s tendency to impede
understanding among persons with disparate views. I addressed reasonability’s
questionable political role in this chapter. In the next two chapters I discuss how
reasonability may make it harder for individuals to communicate with each other in
political and apolitical contexts. I begin by exploring how two disparate viewpoints
might seem similar in a Rawlsian public political sphere. I then examine the benefits of
including comprehensive doctrines in the public political sphere—even asserting that
unreasonable views ought to be welcomed into political decision-making processes. Yet
these are not the only elements of Rawls’s political project we ought to consider before
rejecting reasonability. In the concluding chapters of this paper I illustrate how an
inclusive public political sphere may be a more effective way of bringing about Rawls’s
ideal society than Rawls’s own model of political discourse.
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2. Lost in Translation:
Communicative Problems with Impartiality
i don’t care about reading a poem.
who do you think i am, robert frost?
i have never been in the woods and i hate walking
- S. Roggenbuck

In the last chapter I asserted that Rawls’s political reasonability is neither
necessarily reasonable nor necessarily political. My objections in the last chapter
attempted to provide a critique of Rawls from within his own assumptions. I relied on
Rawls’s vision of the political conception of justice, public reason and partially and fully
comprehensive doctrines. I illustrated that the political conception of justice can function
as a partially comprehensive doctrine as Rawls defines partially comprehensive doctrines.
I also explained how the political conception of justice dictates the content of public
reason. Given these two assertions, public reason is not impartial to comprehensive
doctrines. In fact public reason is constituted by one particular comprehensive doctrine.
Having already met Rawlsian public reason on its own terms, I now critique some
of the basic assumptions that ground Rawls’s political project. Recall Rawls’s reasoning
behind advocating for an impartial public discourse. One reason Rawls wants an
impartial public political sphere is so reasonable citizens can communicate on terms they
all agree to. Rawls attempts to create a common ground where citizens can express
themselves in a way in which others will understand them. But, Rawls only thinks
impartiality is critical in political discussions. When citizens talk about other matters, it
is not as important that they converse on mutually acceptable terms.
28

In this chapter I explore whether we ought to continue Rawls’s project of striving
toward an impartial public political sphere or if we ought to discuss political
fundamentals in the same way we discuss ideas in background culture. I begin by
claiming that citizens engage in an act of translation when expressing themselves in a
Rawlsian public political sphere. This translation presents two barriers to political
discourse. First, some citizens’ thoughts will be easier to translate than others, giving
them a greater ability to express their views as they affirm them. Second, when a citizen
expresses themselves in reasonable terms, there is a chance that parts of their views might
get lost in translation. If impartial communication brushes over differences in citizens’
views, it might lead to unnecessary confusion. Here I compare Rawls’s ‘justice as
fairness’ with His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama’s ‘secular ethics’, each of which claim to
be based on values shared by a variety of comprehensive doctrines. Through this
example I illustrate how communicating in terms of one comprehensive doctrine over
another may lead to misunderstandings, even when persons seem to be in agreement.
Next, drawing on Michael Sandel’s critique of Rawls, I assert that impartiality is not a
realistic or constructive expectation for persons engaged in political discourse. I
conclude that we ought not continue to seek impartiality in political discourse.
For Rawls it is extremely important that political discourse be impartial in regard
to particular comprehensive doctrines. On Rawls’s view partiality can lead to undue
coercion and political instability. Moreover Rawls values maintaining a discourse free of
particular personal views as a means of preserving productive, functional discussions in
the public sphere. Yet Rawls does not claim that persons express themselves without a
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particular grounding, merely that they ought to express themselves in a manner all
reasonable persons can relate to when discussing political matters. In order to do so,
persons must engage in political discourse from within the confines of Rawlsian
reasonability. For Rawls, communicating on reasonable terms doesn’t mean citizens
can’t still ground their views in comprehensive doctrines. When citizens participate in
public reason, however, Rawls claims they ought to engage in an act of translation so that
all other reasonable persons can understand them. Individuals ought to translate the
political views they hold on the basis of their comprehensive doctrines into the language
of reasonable political discourse as defined by Rawls’s political conception of justice
(Peoples 132).
To illustrate this process, consider a group of people whose native languages
differ. Let’s say that one of these individual’s native languages is English, one Japanese,
one Swahili, one Italian. Each of these languages are unique, though some may have
spaces of overlap. Now imagine that the people who speak Japanese, Swahili, and Italian
also speak English as a second language. Given this information it is clear that these
people ought to speak English if they hope to communicate effectively among all four of
them. In fact, communication will be rather simple. The individuals whose native
languages are not English will simply translate their thoughts into English before
expressing them. Rawls might say these four different native language speakers are
analogous to citizens who live in the same polis but don’t subscribe to the same personal
doctrines. Just as these different speakers ought to communicate in their common
language, reasonable people with different comprehensive doctrines ought to
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communicate based on overlapping consensus.
Yet just like when ideas are translated between languages, reasonable people
might lose some of the content of their thoughts by expressing them reasonably.
Particularly when discussing political matters, individuals from different cultural and
linguistic backgrounds might be saying the same word but mean radically different
things. As I am sure many readers have experienced, the same is true of persons with
different comprehensive doctrines, even if they speak the same language. There is no
guarantee that what a Catholic means when they say ‘justice’ is the same as what a
Buddhist or Rawlsian or any number of other persons might mean. The same can be said
of any other fundamental political term. Rawls’s insistence that citizens ought to ‘speak
the same language’ in public reason is not a guarantee that they will know what their
peers are signifying when they express themselves.
Yet reasonability is more like a language game than a language. In his
Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein refers to different ways of
communicating about particular topics language games (Wittgenstein 28-31). Each game
has a specific set of rules speakers must know in order to effectively communicate or
play the game. For example, the way a Catholic talks about religion may be a language
game while the way Rawls talks about politics may be another. As such, Rawlsian
reasonability asks reasonable persons to learn the language game of reasonability and
play by its rules in the public political sphere. Importantly, Rawls expects persons to
play by reasonability’s language game at the expense of the language games they might
use to describe their views in a private setting. Adding language games to the equation
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only further complicates how persons communicate their thoughts in the public political
sphere. When switching between language games individuals might use the same words
in different ways. Though Rawls would like persons to separate the content of their
thoughts according to public political and personal language games, this may not be an
easy feat.
There is also a political dimension to this interaction. When it comes to the
shared language or language game, in this case English, the native speaker seems to have
the authority on what English words mean, or at least what they ought to mean. As the
authority, the native English speaker’s intentional spoken or heard meanings will likely
be taken as the final meanings of the content of all three speakers’ words. The relative
historical political privilege an English speaker has over others further strengthens the
English speaker’s power over them. In fact, this power relationship likely motivated the
other three people to learn English in the first place.
Similarly, a Rawlsian has the final say on what is and is not reasonable.
Rawlsians, as native speakers of ‘reasonability’ can decide which views ought to be
expressed in the public sphere and which ought to be translated first. Moreover, when
considering Rawls as a historical figure, Rawls’s race, gender, and position as a
prominent academic in a well-developed tradition of Western political thought, all give
him power akin to the native English speaker. Just as English functions as a taken for
granted mode of international communication, Western conceptions of impartial political
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discourse shape discourse worldwide (Patton 48).6
The main difference between Rawlsian public reason and the scenario described
above is the number of options available to each group. While it would likely take many
years for the English speaker to learn one of the languages of his peers, understanding
where someone with a different comprehensive doctrine is coming from may be much
simpler. Individuals with different comprehensive doctrines can state their views and
how they inform their thoughts on important political questions. Though this process
may still be difficult, sharing personal doctrines can be done relatively briefly. Rawls
may object that introducing personal doctrines into public discourse might halt political
discussion. Yet including personal doctrines in political discourse will only improve
citizens’ understandings of one another, even if their views are incommensurable.
I will provide another example to illustrate how confusion may result from
persons’ attempts at impartiality. Consider the following quotes:
What we need today is an approach to ethics which makes no recourse to religion
and can be equally acceptable to those with faith and those without.
[We ought to] ground inner values...without depending on religion.
The sentiment expressed by these quotations could easily be taken from Rawls’s work.
Yet these quotes actually come from His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet’s most
recent book on secularism, Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World (xii-xiv; xiv).
According to the Dalai Lama, there ought to be a universal normative guide to how
persons ought to act. The Dalai Lama’s picture of how this normative guide might come
6

For example, the Dalai Lama’s decision to step down as the head of the Tibetan government
can be interpreted as an attempt to secularize or make the Tibetan government appear more
reasonable in a Rawlsian sense. More on the Dalai Lama’s politics later in this chapter.
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about is similar to Rawlsian overlapping consensus in that both Rawls and the Dalai
Lama see their views as justifiable from a variety of acceptable perspectives (Beyond xii).
The Dalai Lama even comes up with two basic principles that ought to govern
persons’ orientations toward political conversations, much like Rawls does in Justice As
Fairness. The two principles the Dalai Lama provides are as follows:
The first principle is the recognition of our shared humanity and our shared
aspiration to happiness and the avoidance of suffering, the second is the
understanding of interdependence as a key feature of human reality, including our
biological reality as social animals...Together, I believe, they constitute an
adequate basis for establishing ethical awareness and the cultivation of inner
values. (Beyond 19)
There are two ways to interpret the similarities between the Dalai Lama’s ethical theory
and Rawls’s. The reader can interpret the Dalai Lama’s views as in line with Rawls’s
views on secularism. Alternatively, the reader may interpret these two influential
philosophers as having distinct views on how individuals ought to act in regard to public
conceptions of the good. I will examine each of these interpretations in turn.
One could argue that Rawls and the Dalai Lama hold similar views about how
public discourse ought to function. The Dalai Lama’s two principles, avoiding suffering
and interdependence, could be interpreted as analogous to Rawls’s two principles of
justice as explained in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of
the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (42-3)
The Dalai Lama’s notion of shared humanity might be interpreted as similar to Rawls’s
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claim that persons possess indefeasible claims to basic liberties. Moreover, a Rawlsian
ear might hear the Dalai Lama’s emphasis on interdependence as akin to Rawls’s
difference principle.
Assuming that the two views are similar, what would Rawls do with these
similarities? Would he consider the Dalai Lama’s views reasonable? The answer, I
believe, is that it depends. If Rawls were presented with the above quotes and nothing
else, he might be quick to embrace the Dalai Lama’s views as reasonable. As Christian
Rostbøll states in his work on autonomy and freedom of expression, persons tend to think
they interpret another’s view with respect and accuracy by following their own cultural
norms, not the other’s (Rostbøll 13). Rawls would also likely be very excited by any
ideological similarities he saw between his views and the Dalai Lama’s due to the
eminence of their source. Yet if Rawls actually read Beyond Religion in its entirety and
had any kind of basic knowledge of Tibetan Buddhism, he might be more hesitant to call
the Dalai Lama’s views reasonable. This brings us to the second interpretation of the
Dalai Lama’s views: that they do not align with Rawls’s.
While the introduction to Beyond Religion seems very Rawlsian, the Dalai Lama
goes on to explain how a number of Tibetan Buddhist concepts, including meditation and
Tibetan psychology, are crucial to cultivating the right kind of conception of justice. Yet
someone familiar with basic Buddhist tenets doesn’t have to read Beyond Religion to see
how a Buddhist comprehensive doctrine informs the Dalai Lama’s two principles. As
they are used in the quotes above, the terms ‘inner values’, ‘aspiration’, ‘suffering’,
‘interdependence’, ‘awareness’, and ‘cultivation’ all carry connotations specific to
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Tibetan Buddhism and its doctrine of compassion. Even though it may seem like Rawls
and the Dalai Lama are speaking the same language, they very well may not be. For
example, while Rawls claims individuals ought not invoke personal doctrines when
making political decisions, it is extremely unlikely that the Dalai Lama would state that
members of the Central Tibetan Administration ought not refer to their Tibetan Buddhist
personal doctrines in political discussions. Yet, the two could likely have a conversation
using the language of Rawlsian reasonability and not even realize that they might
disagree about the content of their statements.
Moreover, like the example with the native speakers of different languages, there
may be a political element to the Dalai Lama’s views on secularism. In fact, some
commentators might draw on the Dalai Lama’s devotion to the Tibetan people and
abhorrence of their treatment inside Tibet to claim that the Dalai Lama’s decision to
secularize his thoughts and the Tibetan government may be part of an overall strategy to
‘modernize’ to win the favor of powerful Western nations (“Message”; “Remarks”;
Sangay; “Statement”).
Yet the most useful lesson we can take away from the Dalai Lama’s views in
Beyond Religion might be a more acute awareness of a thinker’s inability to identify the
presence of their own personal doctrines in what they consider a secular view. As a
cultural American with a baseline of knowledge about Tibetan Buddhist culture and
philosophy it is easy for me to identify places where the Dalai Lama invokes his Tibetan
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Buddhist doctrines while attempting to present an impartial view.7 Identifying these
places in Rawls’s work is far more difficult. We should attempt, however, to subject our
own cultural assumptions to the same scrutiny we apply to cultural assumptions that are
foreign to us.
According to Michael Sandel, Rawls’s and the Dalai Lama’s inability to craft an
impartial public sphere is not a failing specific to them. Rather their partiality is
indicative of the ineffectiveness of impartial public reason. Sandel states that Rawls’s
insistence that citizens sideline their comprehensive moral and religious doctrines in
political contexts places an “unduly severe restriction [on citizens] that would impoverish
political discourse and rule out important dimensions of public deliberation” (Sandel,
1776). For Sandel impartiality is neither sustainable nor desirable. In his critique of
Rawls, Sandel states “democratic politics cannot long abide a public life as abstract and
decorous, as detached from moral purposes, as Supreme court opinions are supposed to
be” (Sandel 1793-4). Here Sandel is in direct dialogue with Rawls’s idea that
reasonability only ought to be applied to purely political settings. Yet as we saw in the
last chapter, institutionally legitimized modes of discourse constitute how we gauge
arguments in a wide variety of contexts. Instead of scolding Rawls and the Dalai Lama
for their views’ rootedness in personal doctrines, Sandel would welcome their opinions as
valuable contributions to political discourse.
On Sandel’s view, the content of any claim about justice is rooted so firmly in a

7

HH the Dalai Lama’s interpretation of ‘secularism’ may also be different than how we
traditionally understand secularism in the United States. This issue will be examined later in this
paper.
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comprehensive doctrine that an individual cannot express their political views without
explicitly invoking their personal views. If public reason must exclude views that rely on
one comprehensive doctrine at the expense of others, public reason will not be discourse
so much as citizens sitting around staring at one another.
But how do we avoid this? Without a common ground in which individuals can
share their views, won’t we just end up with a room full of blank stares anyway? In the
next sections I attempt to answer this question in the negative. I begin by examining why
a cultural background in the Western tradition might predispose us to find Rawlsian
impartiality an intuitive way to mediate differences of opinion in the public sphere. Here
I illuminate the concrete ways in which Rawlsian reasonability functions as a personal
doctrine. Next I offer Indian secularism as an alternative to the Western secular
paradigm. I conclude with an exploration of how a secularism more akin to India’s open
partiality might be practically instituted in the United States.
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3. Re-Envisioning Secularism in the Public Sphere
i have read the biography of alexander graham bell,
thomas edisan, and the earl of sandwich
i have studied the titanic
and posted a widely read website on the topic
currently i am researching to write a novel about a war
between ghosts and humans.
the more i read, the more i believe in ghosts,
although, i have not had an experience with one myself
- S. Roggenbuck

It’s no secret that different cultural contexts lead people to see things differently.
Even when people share ideas across cultural boundaries, one group of people may pick
up another’s concept, story, or tradition and use it in a new way. One example of such an
exchange involves an Indian fable about blind men and an elephant. In the Indian version
of the story, six blind men attempt to figure out what an elephant is like. The men each
come into contact with a particular part of the elephant. Because of their different
perceptions, the men believe the elephant is similar to a number of disparate objects such
as a spear, a pillar, a cliff, and a rope, among others. A prince watches the men quibble
about the nature of the elephant, knowing all the while what the elephant is like. Only by
combining their perceptions can the men begin to understand the elephant on their own.
The moral of the fable is that complete knowledge comes from two sources: omniscient
seers like the prince and cooperation among fallible beings (Laine 5; Seven 35).
In an American version, published in the early 90s, the elephant’s nature is
uncovered not through cooperation or the help of an outside source, but by a blind mouse
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(mice are substituted for men in the American version).8 Instead of needing to rely on
cooperation this mouse, though otherwise like all the others, is able to use her own
experiences paired with a bit of reason to deduce what the elephant is (Seven 35-39). The
different endings of these two versions of the fable indicate a difference in ancient Indian
and contemporary American relationships to knowledge. Ancient Indian philosophers
customarily recognized the partiality of their points of view and their incomplete
relationship to Truth (Laine 7). Yet contemporary Americans tend to subscribe to
narratives of rugged individuals who can grasp just about anything if they are clever and
work hard enough.
A Rawlsian would likely say that we ought to be like the intelligent mouse and
use reason to uncover Truth through our own faculties insofar as we can. For Rawls,
reason may even be like the omniscient prince. Joshua Cohen points to reason’s
centrality in Rawls’s work in his “For A Democratic Society” (2003). Rawls’s reliance
on reasonability, Cohen states,
may leave the impression that Rawls’s theory of justice in some way denigrates
democracy, perhaps subordinating it to a conception of justice that is defended
through philosophical reasoning and is to be implemented by judges and
administrators insulated from politics. (86)
By asserting that Rawls may be ‘denigrating democracy’, Cohen indicates that Rawlsian
reasonability does not allow for democratic political discussions comprised of a truly
diverse array of viewpoints. Instead, Cohen claims, Rawls advocates for a kind of public
reason that “subordinates citizens to philosophers” who attempt to rely on pure reason

8

The mouse also so happens to be the only white mouse in this version of the story, but that is a
topic for a different paper.
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alone in their political arguments (Cohen 121). The force of Cohen’s claim is
particularly strong here due to its implication that Rawls’s reasonable people may
resemble Platonic philosopher kings ruling over subjects with inferior capacities of
reason.
Cohen may be on to something here. Though I would not go so far as to say that
Rawls advocates a Platonic Republic, Rawls’s reasoning might mirror Plato’s in
important ways. In Book VI of The Republic Plato defines philosophers as ‘wisdomlovers’, stating that only philosophers can see things as they are. According to Plato, the
unique relationship philosophers have with knowledge makes them the best rulers for his
ideal state (Plato 91-2, 175-189). Reasonable people and philosopher kings are the only
citizens whose opinions ought to be taken seriously in Rawls’s and Plato’s respective
forms of political discourse. Like philosopher kings, reasonable people have a unique
aptitude for making decisions about political matters.
While philosopher kings are just flat out smarter and more educated than their
subjects, a reasonable person’s right to rule comes from their ability to set aside their
personal doctrines in political contexts. In the previous chapter I argued that separating
personal and political doctrines in political discourse may not be helpful, or even
possible. In the following chapter I explore whether the ability to separate out one’s
personal views ought to be valued as a political pursuit, even if it might be very difficult
to achieve. I pay particular attention to how Rawlsian reasonability may itself be a
personal doctrine independent of its functional role in Rawls’s process of
reasonabilization. In this way I attempt to engage directly with what I imagine to be
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Rawls’s comprehensive doctrine to better understand his political views. Ultimately I
contradict Rawlsian thought and conclude that the kind of understanding gained from an
analysis of personal views ought to be encouraged in the public political sphere. This
conclusion lays the foundation for my argument that an openly partial public political
sphere will bring about a more just world more effectively than Rawls’s impartial public
political sphere.
I. SEPARATIST SECULARISM: THE WESTERN PARADIGM
Rawls’s vision of the public political sphere is all about separating one’s personal
views from political decision making processes. Separation is nothing new in Western
political philosophy. One particular iteration of separatism, secularism, is a fundamental
concept in Rawlsian reasonability, and American politics more generally. Yet what,
exactly, do we mean when we say something is secular or that something ought to be
secular? According to Rawls, secularism “take[s] the truths of religion off the political
agenda” (Liberalism 151). In the first chapter we saw what Rawls means when he asks
citizens to remove religion and other doctrines of truth or right from political discussions.
Rawlsian reasonability dictates that citizens ought to censor their personal views in the
public sphere and present their thoughts by appealing to considerations other citizens can
accept.
In the last section we saw how the understanding generated by communicating on
a reasonable common ground might not be adequate to bring about meaningful political
discourse. The conclusion I drew in the last section may not seem groundbreaking. Of
course our understanding of others’ views is limited if they are asked to explain their
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opinions without reference to their personal doctrines of truth or right. But if our
understanding is hampered, why would Rawls ask citizens to limit how they make
political arguments? The answer may lie in the Western9 tradition of secularism dating
back to European modernism.
In the United States, secularism is often discussed in reference to the separation of
church and state (Sangay 292). On this understanding, secularism prevents religion from
acting as a legitimate basis for political reasoning. More than that, however, Western
secularism implies a separation of personal values and political reason. Separating
reason from personal views outside the context of religion and politics is not mandated in
any of the United States’ political documents. Yet recall how Rawls claims all
comprehensive doctrines ought to be removed from person’s reasoning in political
contexts. Contemporary liberal notions of the public sphere like Rawls’s indicate just
how pervasive the desire to separate personal and political matters is. Theoretically, an
impartial public sphere guards citizens against discrimination and persecution. Impartial
political structures do this by being ‘blind’ to citizens’ personal characteristics such as
gender, age, race, and religion. Rather than allowing these differences to determine the
kind of treatment individuals receive in the public sphere, Western secularism strives to
create equality before the law (Larson 210).
Contemporary political philosopher Charles Taylor explores the historic
foundations of the dominant Western orientation toward secularism in his book A Secular
9

Using the term ‘Western’ to describe a tradition of, and orientation toward, secularism is
inherently inaccurate. I recognize that by referring to these ideas as ‘Western secularism’ I am
reducing the Western world to a single viewpoint and implying that such a world is a coherent
concept. Though I agree with the critiques, I will continue to use this signifier when necessary for
the sake of clarity and consistency.
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Age. Taylor explains that Western ideas about secularism are rooted in what he calls “the
powerful modern ontic dualism” (Taylor 773). Epitomized in Cartesian mind-body
dualism, modern ontic dualism signifies a noumenal realm that contains two different
kinds of substances: mental and physical. Building on Descartes’ division of the modern
world into mind substance and physical substance, rationalist thought emerged as
separate from and privileged above religious sentiments. Rationality’s emerging
superiority can even be seen in Descartes’ cogito ‘I think, therefore I am’. Here a
person’s existence is contingent upon their capacity to reason rather than their
embodiment.
According to Taylor, modern ontic dualism led rationalists to see themselves as
independent minds ruling over “a mechanistic, meaning-shorn universe, without internal
purposes such as the older cosmos had” (Taylor 773). When Taylor uses the phrase
‘older cosmos’ he suggests that rationalism is in opposition to what came before it. On
this view, modern rationalism negates the earlier religious order by stripping religion of
its symbolic meanings. From a modern rationalist perspective, symbolic meanings
detract from a person’s ability to engage in just reason. Instead of bringing about just
societies, the argument goes, religious reasoning creates fictional and unjustified
inequalities. The inequality that stems from religious doctrines makes rationality a
superior mode of judgment for the modern rationalist. Western secularism, then, defines
itself on the basis of its lack of subordination to religious doctrines.
Rawls’s political liberalism fits squarely within Taylor’s conception of the
Western secular tradition. Like modern rationalists, Rawls places reasonability in a
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position of superiority relative to all other ideologies in politics and public reason.
Unlike early Western secularism, however, Rawlsian reasonability does not limit its
political exclusion of personal doctrines to religious reasoning. Rightly seeing the
similarities between religious doctrines and other so-called secular doctrines of truth or
right, Rawls asserts that all doctrines of truth or right ought to be kept out of public
reason. Here Rawls’s work indicates that Western secularists’ distrust of religious
reasoning has expanded to a skepticism toward all personal doctrines of truth or right. It
seems Rawls is concerned about the kinds of symbolisms and meaning-ridden universes
that any personal doctrine might create, not just religious ones. For Rawls, reasonability
reigns supreme.
I.1 MODERN SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
As we saw in the first chapter, Rawls only requires that discourse be limited to
political reasonability in purely political conversations about political fundamentals.
However we also saw that the legitimacy given to reasonable arguments in political
conversations influences the kinds of arguments citizens deem acceptable in a wide range
of discourse. Recall how students in a college-level English class censored their religious
views on evil for fear that they were inappropriate in an academic setting. Charles Taylor
would not be surprised by these students’ self-censorship. According to Taylor, Western
secularism isn’t just about separating rationality from irrationality. Rather the political
and academic power behind rationalism causes it to seep into the very meaning of
personhood in a modern rationalist society.
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Just as modern rationalism separates personal and political reasons in political
discourse, it also separates good and bad practices, ideas, and even people. Modern
persons see the world through a lens Taylor refers to as ‘modern self-consciousness’.
Modern self-consciousness, Taylor states, tells people “that certain things are ‘modern’,
that other practices are ‘backward’, that this idea is positively ‘medieval’, and that other
one is ‘progressive’” (Taylor 301). In this way, modern persons divide the world into
two opposing realms: one progressive, the other close-minded or archaic. Modern selfconsciousness is not a trivial portion of modern citizen’s conception of their
surroundings. The normative judgments a person evaluates through modern selfconsciousness are of the utmost importance and urgency in their worldview.
The reason for this urgency, Taylor states, is modern self-consciousness’s utility
as a barrier between modern society and atrocity. According to Taylor, we, as modern
agents, “place ourselves [relative] to our own ‘barbarian’ past, and to other, less fortunate
peoples” (Taylor 301). The modern rationalist perceives atrocities committed by fellow
humans as originating in faulty reasoning. If only those people had been more
reasonable, the argument goes, the world would be free of horrible acts like rape and
genocide. The Western separatist model of secularity portrays what it perceives to be
pure reason as morally superior to arguments perceived as stemming from personal
doctrines of truth or right. Secularism is superior due to its unique ability to provide an
impartial political sphere free of symbolic, spiritual, or otherwise biased arguments. In
this way, rationality cleanses the modern person of connection to, or responsibility for,
human fallibility and atrocity. As a result, modern rationalists do not trust non46

rationalists’ arguments to be free of horrible consequences in the same way. Here we can
see why modern rationalists might attempt to safeguard secularism so vigilantly. To the
modern rationalist, irrationality is the basis of evil in the world.
While Rawlsian reasonability is not exactly Taylor’s modern rationality, the two
share a common history and many points of similarity. The modern rationalist’s
normative dichotomy between reason and personal doctrines is mirrored in Rawls’s
distinction between reasonability and unreasonability. While Rawlsian citizens with
reasonable doctrines are encouraged to voice their views in reasonable public discourse,
citizens whose political arguments are founded in unreasonable doctrines ought not be
taken seriously.
Yet modern self-consciousness may be about more than distrusting unreasonable
personal doctrines. As Joshua Cohen states:
Rawls supposes that he is addressing himself to citizens who hold political
opinions (ideas of justice and the common good); acknowledge that they, along
with officials and parties, have the deliberative responsibility of presenting public
arguments at least about fundamental laws and policies by reference to such
opinions; and are uncertain about whether their actual views are the most
reasonable political opinions. Recognizing their responsibility, they are looking
for guidance on how best to understand justice and the common good in a society
of equals. (Cohen 102)
Rawlsian citizens take their deliberative responsibilities very seriously. On Taylor’s
view, the seriousness of this duty stems from reason’s ability to act as a safeguard against
atrocity. The gravity of reasonability causes modern rationalists to distrust even their
own judgment. Recognizing that they too are fallible, Rawlsian citizens look to those in
positions of political power or ideological privilege for the kinds of arguments they ought
to make. Persons’ distrust of their own personal doctrines helps explain why they are so
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willing to put their faith in modern rationality or Rawlsian reasonability in the political
realm. Individuals do not want to be singled out as possessing unreasonable views. By
disassociating from their personal views in the public sphere, citizens can cleanse
themselves of responsibility for any negative consequences that may result from political
decision making processes.
Rawls himself seems to fit into Taylor’s model of modern self-consciousness.
Like an individual whose worldview is influenced by the modern ontic dualism of
rationality and personal doctrines, Rawls holds that reasonable arguments are more
progressive than, and normatively superior to, unreasonable ones. In fact, Rawls’s
insistence on reasonability in political discourse may be founded in his own encounters
with atrocity.
As an undergraduate, Rawls’s views on political discourse closely mirrored mine.
In his undergraduate thesis Rawls criticized political philosophers’ tendency to create a
“false dichotomy between the individual and society” that led to some individuals being
excluded from political deliberation (Gregory 194-5). Rawls’s early view would
certainly not mesh with reasonability’s debasing of personal doctrines. So what
happened after Rawls’s undergraduate thesis? In an attempt to explain this change
ethicist Eric Gregory states:
what happened after his thesis? The short answer is World War II, the Holocaust,
and Hiroshima. Rawls graduated from Princeton, and served in the Pacific for
three years...He rode on a train through the ruins of Hiroshima after learning of
Auschwitz. He lost many friends during the war. By June of 1945 Rawls
abandoned his thoughts of entering seminary...and renounced his early religious
faith. The arguments he made in his thesis were no longer convincing. (Gregory
195)
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Gregory points to Rawls’s distrust of personal doctrines after witnessing humans commit
grave atrocity. Writing in reference to the Holocaust, Richard Bernstein builds on the
idea that atrocity changes how persons think about the world. Bernstein states,
We may desperately want to believe that there is something about human beings
that cannot be transformed, some thing deep about the human self, the voice of
conscience that cannot be obliterated. But after totalitarianism, we can no longer
hold onto those beliefs. This is the specter that now haunts us. (Bernstein 177-78,
Dawes 57)
The specter of World War II haunts Rawls. After World War II, Rawls cannot
find an unmovable portion of the human mind that resists barbarism. For Rawls the only
hope of preventing atrocity is maintaining impartial reason and shutting out personal
doctrines in political decision-making. Rawls’s rejection of personalism following World
War II indicates that his reverence for reason is consistent with Taylor’s assertion that
modern rationalism attempts to separate secularists from evil.
Yet recall Sandel’s ‘unencumbered self’ objection to Rawlsian reasonability.
According to Sandel, we cannot be impartial in public reason—nor ought we be. Also
recall my critique that Rawlsian reasonability is partial and subtly coercive rather than
impartial and non-coercive. Rawls’s desire to prevent atrocity sheds new light on why
Rawls may stand firm with reasonability despite these critiques. According to Rawls, we
ought not allow the seemingly impossible nature of impartiality prevent us from striving
toward an ideal, impartial society (Restatement 5).
I.2 REASONABILITY AS A SHIELD AGAINST EVIL
Rawls would likely claim that we ought to privilege reasonability even though its
hegemonic power creates its own legitimating consensus among citizens. At the
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foundation of this claim, should Rawls make it, is an assumption that reasonability will
act as a safeguard against atrocity. Though we have seen how this assumption developed,
we have yet to see if we ought to continue to strive to create a reasonable public political
sphere.
The argument for reasonable public political spheres seems intuitive enough.
According to Rawls, an individual is reasonable if they offer political reasons another
reasonable person could reasonably accept. The pervasiveness of ‘reason’ aside, Rawls’s
argument makes a lot of sense. Presumably no one would ever be able to accept being
the victim of atrocity. So, as long as citizens consider what other citizens can reasonably
accept, there won’t be any arguments for atrocity.
Of course, it’s not quite that simple. How do we define atrocity? And, as is
always the question, how do we define reasonability? Is killing someone an atrocity? Is
killing someone who we think is committing an atrocity an atrocity? Would killing Hitler
have been atrocity? Assuming we consider Hitler unreasonable, what are the grounds on
which we make that judgment? Are we unreasonable for seeking to wipe out those who
seek to wipe out others? As you can see, these distinctions are not as clear as they first
appear. Yet if a person is adequately reasonable, they ought to have the answers to these
kinds of questions.
Cohen points to the possibility that reasonable persons wonder if they themselves
are ‘reasonable enough’ to live up to a Rawlsian ideal. According to Rawls, these very
people ought to make political decisions in the examples I gave above. So how can a
citizen tell if they or someone else is reasonable? How can they tell if someone is evil
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(taking evil to be something we would associate with the likes of Hitler)?
Consider the following example:
He specialized in ethics at his university under a prominent...moral philosopher,
loved Tolstoy, and immersed himself in...literature...that promoted individualism
and humanism...He worked for the Ministry of Education after graduation but as a
man of conscience, quit in protest when asked to perform an ‘ideology inspection’
on a scholar he admired. After that, he worked as a teacher at a teachers’ college.
He was then drafted...
Given our knowledge of Rawls’s philosophy and the biographical details I supplied in
this paper, the man described in the passage above could easily be John Rawls. But it’s
not. Instead the excerpt is a description of Ebato-san, a Japanese war criminal who is
profiled in James Dawes’s book Evil Men (Dawes 183).
What happened here? Why did Rawls and Ebato-san begin life so similarly and
end up in such different places? Unlike my questions about Hitler, atrocity, and
reasonability, this question has a simple answer: context. While Rawls entered the
American army during World War II, Ebato-san was drafted into the Japanese army
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Given their similar backgrounds, why ought we
consider Rawls’s opinions legitimate in the public sphere but discount Ebato-san’s?
Rawls would respond that we ought to judge individuals based on their actions, not where
those actions came from. Fair enough. But do we ever consider Ebato-san reasonable
again? What if he really has changed? How do we know?
In Evil Men Dawes suggests that the problem with these questions may not be
how to answer them. Instead, the problem may lie with the questions themselves. Dawes
calls this dilemma the ‘paradox of evil’. “We must and must not demonize” those who
commit atrocities, Dawes writes, “We must not demonize because to demonize is to
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adopt a stance that shares features with the demonic: namely, a dismissal of the other’s
full humanity” (Dawes 34). Returning to Rawlsian reasonability, the question for us then
becomes whether demonizing someone and subsequently labeling them unreasonable
dismisses their full humanity.
To answer this question, it is helpful to return to Joshua Cohen’s work. In his
analysis of Rawls, Cohen rightly asserts that Rawls’s conception of personhood involves
two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a concept of the
good (Cohen 107). Cohen also points out that citizens “regard one another as free and
equal persons by virtue of their possession of these powers” (Cohen 107). For the
purposes of this paper I assume that the idea of an individual being a ‘free and equal
person’ is an essential component of a Rawlsian conception of ‘full humanity’. If this is
the case, all fully human persons, in a Rawlsian sense, possess the capacity for a sense of
justice and a capacity for a concept of the good. Certainly possessing a capacity for
something is not the same as actually possessing it. So, perhaps when Rawls says that we
ought not to consider unreasonable arguments attention-worthy in the public sphere, he is
not disrespecting the unreasonable person’s fully humanity.
But Cohen might not agree. According to Cohen, the fact that, in a Rawlsian
society, “the possession of the oral power to form and exercise a sense of justice is the
basis of equality...[my peers] show respect by acknowledging and protecting my right to
bring my sense of justice to bear on public affairs” (Cohen 109). What does it mean to
bring one’s sense of justice to bear on public affairs? Rawls may state that the
unreasonable person’s ability to express themselves in public reason is enough to
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constitute respect toward their sense of justice. Yet mere toleration is not synonymous
with respect. Rather respect comes from a willingness to understand the other on their
terms in addition to (or instead of) asking them to express themselves merely on the
reasonable terms one accepts. So how ought we determine if individuals are being
respected? Cohen states, “When others respect me as an equal, they confirm my sense of
my own value” (Cohen 109). It is not clear from Rawls’s work how Rawls would
respond to this sentiment. Yet if I were ignored in public reason based on my supposed
unreasonableness I would not feel as if those around me were confirming my sense of
value. Instead of respected, I would likely feel rather alienated.
Alienation is inherent in Rawls’s model of public reason. By creating a
dichotomy between reasonable and unreasonable persons and arguments, Rawlsian
theory forges an in-group of pure, reasonable people who agree with him juxtaposed with
an out-group of those who do not. In Evil Men Dawes is quick to point to humans’
universal preference for our in-group’s way of thinking while faulting those who disagree
with us. According to Dawes, there is little normative difference between our in-group’s
preferences and other groups’ preferences beyond the significance group members give
them. While we see our ideas as having a unique relationship to Truth, we perceive
others’ as lacking truth value. But according to Dawes, we’re all just fanatics.
“Fanaticism is a necessary aspect of human identity, and a prerequisite for social
interaction,” Dawes states, “although when people are fanatical about things that fit in
with social norms or our own values, we don’t call it fanaticism. We call it ‘belief’” (62).
By understanding that others perceive our views to be just as alienating as we perceive
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theirs, we may be able to work toward a more self-aware and inclusive mode of
communicating with those who disagree with us. Moreover, if we are able to identify the
foundations of our differences by locating their sources in personal doctrines, we may
even be able to understand each other and engage in political discourse with a deeper
respect for each other’s humanity.
Unfortunately, categorizing others into groups and seeing one’s own group as
superior to others’ seems to be a natural part of being human. Yet the human tendency to
dehumanize others should not be part of a theory on how political actors ought to act.
Instead, theories of political discourse ought to encourage inclusion and communication.
Asking people to include those who are drastically different from themselves with open
arms may be a request doomed to fail. Yet, as Rawls might say, the idealism of such a
goal should not discourage us from striving for a better future.
II. SYMBIOTIC SECULARISM: THE INDIAN PARADIGM
But if we reject Rawlsian reasonability as an unacceptable paradigm, what will
public discourse look like? How will we ensure public reason allows for equality,
autonomy, and effective communication? Fortunately, we do not have to construct a new
paradigm of public reason from scratch. On the Indian subcontinent, the public sphere is
defined by its own version of secularism. In this section I will explore Indian secularism
and how it differs from the Western tradition.10 I will assert that Indian secularism offers
a practical model for the kind of respectful public reason we might aspire to post-Rawls.
10

As with the term ‘Western’, using the term ‘Indian’ to describe a tradition of, and orientation
toward, secularism is inherently inaccurate. I recognize that by referring to these ideas as ‘Indian
secularism’ I am reducing Indians to a single viewpoint and implying that such a singular ideology
is a coherent concept. Though I agree with the critiques, I will continue to use this signifier when
necessary for the sake of clarity and consistency.
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Though these views are subject to the same particularity as Rawls’s, their awareness and
celebration of their own partiality makes them preferable to Rawlsian reasonability.
While Western secularism separates reason and comprehensive doctrines, Indian
secularism does not dichotomize personal and political beliefs. Instead, Indian discourse
tends to weave together politics, religion, and other normative doctrines. India’s
secularism even goes beyond encouraging religious citizens to express themselves in the
public realm. India’s constitution guarantees a right to religious freedom in much the
same way as the United States’ constitution does. Yet, whereas Western secularism leads
to equality before the law, Indian secularism allows for some explicit overlap between
state and religious doctrines. In India, some laws apply differently to members of
different religious groups. For example, there are reserved seats in parliament for
Scheduled Castes and tribes. These reserved spots function in a manner somewhat
similar to affirmative action policies in the United States. Like affirmative action
policies, Indian reserved seats are meant to give historically oppressed groups a more fair
shot at positions traditionally denied to them.
India also has a series of ‘personal laws’ that incorporate religious laws about
family matters into the Indian legal code. Personal laws allow religious groups to follow
the commandments of their religion instead of the ‘neutral’ national law in a variety of
familial contexts such as marriage and divorce (Larson 200). For example, the amount of
alimony Muslim women ought to receive in India is still a hotly contested issue in India
as laws bounce back and forth between orthodox groups, parliament, and the supreme
court which all have different interpretations of Indian constitutional regulations
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(Gurumurthy).
Upon first glance, Indian secularism does not seem much like secularism at all.
How could religious groups even begin to claim that the marriage laws in their religious
texts take precedent over national law? Western scholars may assert that calling India’s
radical pluralism secularism is a category error. To a modern rationalist, secularism
denotes the separation of church and state, not the union of the two.
Religious scholar Gerald Larson recognizes Western discomfort with referring to
Indian institutions as secular. According to Larson, Indian identities are intrinsically
spiritual in a way Western identities are not. Larson claims that because of this intrinsic
spirituality, one must apply the term ‘secular’ to India with a different semantic than one
would apply to a Western nation (Larson 196-7). For Larson, ‘spirituality’, like
‘secularism’, does not have the same meaning when used in reference to Indian politics.
Larson clarifies that when he uses the term spiritual in this context he is “using the word
not in its narrow religious sense” but rather including all spiritual practices and
persuasions as part of a ‘civil religion’ (Larson 196-7). Here Larson shares Peter Van der
Veer’s notion that there is “one great Indian spirituality, which the state provides for”
(Van der Veer 23).
Just as Western attitudes about secularism can be traced to historical movements
in Western thought, the ‘Indian spirituality’ Larson and Van der Veer point to has its
roots in Indian intellectual discourse. Though Indian secularism was not formalized until
the 1940s, its foundations took strong hold in the neo-Hindu movement of the late 19th
Century. During this time Indian reformers like Raja Rammohun Roy and Swami
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Vivekananda invoked classic Indian narratives from Vedanta philosophy and the
Bhagavad Gita as the starting point of a Hindu ‘live and let live’ mentality expressing the
equality and legitimacy of a wide range of spiritual beliefs. For example, in an address to
the World parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 Vivekananda proudly proclaimed,
“We [Hindus] believe not only in universal toleration, but we accept all religions as true”
(Sharma 104).
Mahatma Gandhi went on to apply neo-Hindu tolerant universalism to his
movement for Indian independence. Gandhi claimed religion and politics are
inseparable. In the farewell to his autobiography Gandhi states “there is no other God
than Truth” (Gandhi 504). At first this statement might seem like Gandhi is privileging
reason over religion in a manner reminiscent of modern Western secularism. Yet for
Gandhi the relationship between reason, truth, and religion is not mutually exclusive. For
Gandhi morality is the essence of both religion and politics, marking their inalienable
connection to one another (Sharma 281).
Indian secularism and modern Western secularism do have a good deal of
common ground, however. Both Rawls and Gandhi agree that political views ought to be
founded in personal doctrines, they just disagree about how those views and their
connection to religion or morality ought to be expressed in public discourse. The
difference between Western secular institutions and Indian secular institutions is a
difference between impartiality and neutrality. Rawls’s theory seeks impartiality in the
public sphere. On Rawls’s view, political doctrines ought to be consistent with a wide
range of reasonable views. Indian institutions, however, seek neutrality by striving to
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allow most personal doctrines to flourish without interference from the state.
To the Indian secularist, Rawlsian impartiality may even enhance favoritism
rather than limiting it. According to the Indian paradigm the best way to prevent
favoritism is to openly accept all views in the public sphere. In a critique sharing
sentiments with Sandel’s unencumbered self, an Indian secularist may claim that all
views, however impartial they may seem, come from a particular point of view embedded
in a personal doctrine of truth or right. The illusion that one view is more impartial than
another is rooted in a solipsism that views one’s own perspective as the neutral canvas
against which all other views are judged. According to this logic, asserting that only
reasonable arguments ought to be expressed in public reason favors Rawlsian
reasonability over all other doctrines, even though this form of public reason may appear
impartial to its supporters. Recall how both Rawls and the Dalai Lama’s views might be
interpreted as impartial in some way even though closer examination would likely lead
them to point to the ideological particularity of each other’s views. Here we can also see
how Larson’s assertion that Indian persons are somehow uniquely spiritual is deeply
flawed. All individuals are ‘spiritual’ in the sense of subscribing to a civil religion, not
just Indians.
Rawls would likely worry that if a nation were to accept open partiality instability
and strong partisanship would quickly follow as citizens create echo chambers blocking
out speakers whose views do not align with their own. Yet Rawlsian public reason also
creates an echo chamber. By asserting that unreasonable views are inferior, Rawls’s
political theory creates a liberal partisanship that defines itself by being an echo chamber.
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While open partiality may lead to hardline partisanship, the Rawlsian public sphere
guarantees it. By differentiating between reasonable and unreasonable persons, Rawls
ensures that many views will not be taken seriously in political decision-making
processes. Perhaps Rawls would respond that an echo chamber is not the problem, but
rather that open partiality will lead to too much political instability. Rawls may even
point to the history of ethnic conflict in India as the basis for an argument that Indian
secularism threatens the safety of minority groups.
Yet Ashutosh Varshney’s work for Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and
Muslims in India found that increased contact and ideological exchange between ethnic
groups in India has strengthened comradery between ethnic groups rather than weakening
it (261, 282). Moreover, Varshney contends that ethnic peace ought to be
“conceptualized as an absence of violence, not as an absence of conflict” (283). While
Rawls attempts to avoid conflict, Varshney claims conflict should be welcomed for its
ability to help groups negotiate difference and bring about ideological creativity and
change. Varshney even suggests open partiality may assist minority groups in improving
their social and political positions.
In fact, India’s unique brand of secularism was formalized by Bhimrao Ramji
Ambedkar, a (former) member of India’s untouchable caste who authored the Indian
constitution (Zelliot 157). Ambedkar’s acute awareness of the particularity of what can
sometimes pass as an impartial view is not surprising. As a member of a disadvantaged
group Ambedkar was acutely aware that his political perspective came from a particular
point of view. For individuals like John Rawls, their positionality may be less obvious
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due to their social privilege. Rawls was likely used to being taken seriously, or, in the
very least, not accustomed to his opinions being attributed to his gender or race. In this
way, it may have been easy for Rawls to see his views as impartial.
III. PRACTICAL POSITIONALITY IN PUBLIC REASON
Indian secularist academics are not the only thinkers who advocate for open
partiality in political discourse. In addition to contemporary philosophers like Michael
Sandel, feminist critiques have long taken issue with the notion that one perspective is
superior to another. While feminists began their work critiquing others’ views, third
wave feminists also attempt to be skeptical of their own perspectives.
In her book Inessential Woman Elizabeth Spelman critiques feminist literature as
taking white middle-class women’s opinions as a neutral representation of women’s
perspectives generally (Spelman 9). While it was easy for white middle-class women to
see their views as unbiased when it came to representing women broadly, white middleclass feminist ideology did not take into account the experiences and needs of women
outside their socio-economic group. In an effort to change white middle-class
feminism’s narrow view, Spelman attempts to recognize the particularity of her
perspective in her academic work. For example, in an article Spelman co-authored with
Maria C. Lugones, each author’s positionality is identified throughout the piece. By
speaking in multiple voices and identifying their social privileges and oppressions,
Spelman and Lugones make it clear that their perspectives are just that—perspectives
(Lugones 17). While Spelman does not shy away from making normative assertions in
her writing, she does so with a self-awareness she finds lacking in most contemporary
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discourses.
Perhaps explicit recognition that every idea comes from a specific point of view
seems a bit silly. Of course our ideas come from a point of view—that is simply part of
being a subjective human agent. But it isn’t always that obvious. In fact, the kinds of
obvious things we take for granted are taken for granted for a reason—we forget them.
We forget that even our perspective is a perspective. When we don’t recognize our
positionality, others also forget that we speak from a point of view.
To take an example from my own life, I often assume that the authors of academic
articles are men, even when the author’s name is normatively female. In the past few
weeks alone I can pinpoint three separate instances where I was surprised when my
professors referred to the author of a text using feminine pronouns. In my mind,
academic articles, and the kind of ‘legitimate’ knowledges that come with them, originate
from the hands, minds, mouths, and keyboards of men. These thought patterns are not
because I actively think women are intellectually inferior to men. Rather they are
grounded in my positionality as a student who takes classes in highly male-dominated
fields and twenty one years in an unfortunately patriarchal and misogynist culture.
Feminists aren’t the only Western academics who favor open positionality in the
public sphere. In fact, a variety of contemporary theorists across academic disciplines
question whether impartiality is practical or even ideal. For example NYU professor of
journalism Jay Rosen asserts that contemporary media in the United States is involved in
a project in which neutrality is used in “an attempt to secure a kind of universal
legitimacy that is implicitly denied to those who stake out positions or betray a point of
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view” (Rosen). Here Rosen mirrors Rawls’s desire for impartiality as a form of
legitimacy in government institutions.
Yet according to Rosen and his peer Dan Froomkin, journalists’ constant quest to
be neutral has cost them the ability to foster understanding among various viewpoints and
put pressure on dysfunctional institutions. More pressing, Froomkin and Rosen assert
that journalists may even avoid including ‘harmful facts’ that seem to favor one side over
another in their reports in their attempts to avoid accusations that they are not objective
(Froomkin). When journalists exclude facts for fear of seeming biased, their attempts to
strip themselves of their humanity and become ‘impartial’ are not useful to the public
they hope to serve.
On the surface, the ability of those in power to decide which kinds of arguments
are acceptable in the public sphere is not necessarily a problem on Rawls’s view. If
reasonable persons reject the views of those in power, ‘bad power’ can easily be kept in
check. Yet as we saw in the first chapter, Rawls’s view is not so simple. Exposure to
ideas in the public realm can shape the lens through which citizens see the world. The
political conception of those in power shapes what citizens deem reasonable. In this
sense, those in power decide not only what the political conception ought to be, but, in
doing so, also assure the political conception’s perceived reasonableness. Due to the
political conception’s partiality to those in power Rawls fails to create an impartial, noncoercive conception of justice.
Yet as this chapter indicates, partiality may be a good thing, or at least lack of
impartiality may not be as bad as Rawls’s work indicates. On a basic level, our emotions
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and the comprehensive doctrines that inform them compel us to act where more
‘objective’ arguments may fall short. According to Amartya Sen, this emotional tug
indicates the complementary roles of reason and emotion in human reflection. These
emotions, Sen states, must be taken seriously, though not without some degree of critical
scrutiny (Sen 39). Those who subscribe to a Rawlsian condemnation of partiality in the
political realm would likely respond that our concern for justice or abhorrence at injustice
cannot “build a truly wise concern for humanity [and]...impartial motives based on ideas
of dignity and respect should take its place” (“Compassion” 231). Here a proponent of
political liberalism might state that partiality politics implies a kind of paternalism that
ought to be avoided in these kinds of discussions. By relinquishing veils of impartiality,
institutionally supported views may seem more explicitly coercive than previously
imagined.
In response to the argument that partiality is paternalistic and thus disrespectful,
Michael Sandel states that just the opposite is true. As we have seen, Sandel claims
impartiality exhibits disrespect of others in its failure to engage with others’ convictions
head on. On this view persons ought to listen to, challenge, and contest the
comprehensive doctrines of others rather than shying away from discussing the
ideologies that support our ideas of what is just (Sandel 1794). Philosopher and
theologian David Burrell also affirms the importance of authentic pluralism in political
discourse. On Burrell’s view, discussions that take into account a wide variety of
disparate viewpoints are beneficial insofar as they highlight contradictions between and
within ideologies. In the face of these contradictions, Burrell states, society as a whole is
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better able to flesh out, analyze, and understand the ideologies that lead individuals to
advocate for one outcome over another (Burrell 99).
In support of pluralism Jay Rosen proposes a new kind of public discussion in the
American press. Rejecting neutrality as impractical and detrimental to public discourse,
Rosen advocates for a space in which individuals do not pretend that they do not have a
partial view. Instead, Rosen suggests persons inform each other of where they are
coming from so that others can take their ideologies and its assumptions into account
when evaluating their view. In this way, partiality and pluralism may actually improve
the quality of political discourse.
Rawlsian reasonability does encourage citizens to discuss their comprehensive
doctrines in the public political sphere in certain circumstances. Yet Rawls only finds
comprehensive doctrines permissible so citizens can “explain to one another how their
views do indeed support” the political conception of justice (Peoples 154). In a Rawlsian
society, expressing comprehensive doctrines in the public sphere is a way for citizens to
prove to one another that they are reasonable. Yet as we have seen time and time again,
not all comprehensive doctrines support the political conception of justice. In order to
get to the root of political disagreements, public discourse must include all viewpoints,
not only those that affirm the hegemonic norm.
Even the form of this paper provides an important commentary on the difficulty
involved in derailing taken for granted views. First I offered my own critique of
Rawlsian reasonability, then supported it with critiques from other Western philosophers
like Sandel and Cohen, then compared the Western and Indian contemplative traditions,
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and offered arguments from other academic disciplines. Though this may just be a
symptom of following good practice in writing this kind of paper, my method also
illustrates modern self-consciousness’s reliance on Rawlsian reasonability.
The kind of open pluralism I advocate may never lead to a transcendental form of
justice that works in all cases and can be assented to by all persons. Yet according to
Amartya Sen, inflamed pluralistic discussions “cannot but be of immediate interest both
to policy-making and to the diagnosis of injustice” (Sen 388). With no ideology
necessarily superior to any other, every perspective might have something to offer in the
public political sphere.
Through open discussion persons have greater access to a variety of ideologies in
addition to the outcomes they support. In the very least, partiality indicates a more
authentic mode of discourse that is likely to foster greater understanding between the
proponents of disparate views. At most, partial discussions may bring to light new facts
and ideas that were previously seen as not reasonable or ‘neutral’ enough to be included
in political discussion. In this way, persons will be able to better identify injustice and
strive to create a more just world. Though this system is certainly not perfect, I assert that
it is the best way to reduce injustice and improve the lives of persons living here and
now, as well as in what Rawls would call a ‘realistic utopia’ (Restatement 4).
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PHOTOGRAPH
- S. Roggenbuck

In the preceding chapters I asserted that Rawlsian reasonability ought not be
valued as impartial, non-coercive, or as the best way for citizens to engage with one
another in the public political sphere. Rather than relying on a Rawlsian public sphere as
our paradigm for public discourse, I claimed that we ought to pursue an openly partial
and pluralistic mode of public discussion. Though open partiality might be more
respectful of individuals and a more honest, effective way to communicate, Rawls may
still object that open partiality is not more just than the public sphere he imagines in his
political project. One seeming advantage to Rawls’s view is that his account of justice
makes political decision-making easier. Open partiality may put so many competing
incongruous views in the public sphere that coming to any kind of conclusion about how
to answer questions about justice will be inefficient, if not impossible.
In this chapter I will assert that it is still possible to act decisively to remedy
injustice without a singular conception of justice. I will first explore why a society with a
singular notion of justice might be preferable to one with many competing notions of
justice. Next I will explain how, even from a Rawlsian perspective, a singular notion of
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justice might lead to multiple conclusions. Having laid this foundation I will then turn to
Amartya Sen’s partial rankings of justice as an alternative way to identify injustice. I will
conclude, as Sen does, that identifying injustice need not rely on a single theory of justice
for its basis.
I. TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement John Rawls attempts to answer the
following question:
what is the most acceptable political conception for specifying the fair terms of
cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal as both reasonable and
rational, and (we add as normal and fully cooperating members of society) over a
complete life, from one generation to the next? (7-8)
At the root of this question lie two basic assumptions. The first, that reasonability ought
to be a requirement for full participation in a just society, we have already explored in
detail. Yet even more fundamental to Rawls’s guiding question is the notion that there is
a single, most acceptable political conception that ought to determine how citizens
behave in the political sphere and what the content of public reason ought to be. By
assuming that a society ought to agree on one political conception of justice, Rawls draws
on a long tradition of transcendentalism in Western political philosophy. The term
transcendentalism, as I will use it, refers to the presumption that there ought to be one
kind of argument that satisfies the demands of justice.
It seems John Rawls seeks to create a transcendental theory of justice for many of
the same reasons he favors impartiality: clarity, stability, and creating a public reason on
which all citizens can understand and be understood by their peers. According to Rawls,
having a transcendental set of abstract principles is useful in allowing us to “gain a clear
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and uncluttered view of a question” (Theory 8). According to Rawls, only abstract
conceptions have the power to give us this clear view because they focus “on the more
significant elements [of the question] that we think are most relevant in determining
[its]...most appropriate answer” (Theory 8). For Rawls, this transcendental notion of
justice is crucial to our ability to be able to make judgments that improve institutions by
striving toward the perfectly just. Rawls may well be correct in stating that abstract ideas
help us clarify practical questions about justice. But why does this relationship between
ideal and practical justice mean we need a single political conception of justice? And
why is comparing our world to our perfectly just ideal the best strategy of increasing
justice in a particular society?
On face value, Rawls’s affinity for a transcendental theory of justice is intuitive.
Just as impartial Rawlsian reasonability draws on our intuitive sensibilities about how
justice ought to be, operating under a single concept of justice does as well. Yet as we
have seen throughout this paper, even our most basic intuitions ought to be subjected to
critical scrutiny to illuminate the point of view in which these intuitions originate.
Though this idea is not novel in philosophy—think Descartes’s Meditations—Western
political philosophy seems to hold fast to its basic assumptions with little criticism of
where these assumptions might come from.
In his thought-provoking book The Idea of Justice Amartya Sen challenges the
kind of transcendentalism Rawls takes for granted. For Sen the problem with
transcendentalism lies in its inability to guide decision making processes in the way
Rawls hopes. Both Rawls and Sen subscribe to the idea that decisions about what is just
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in a particular situation ought to be determined by their ability to “survive critical
scrutiny and...have claims to impartiality” (Idea 10). Though I have critiqued the
legitimacy of impartiality, let us put aside my critiques of impartiality for the time being
and assume for the sake of argument that Rawls and Sen are correct in their reverence for
impartiality in discerning just outcomes.
According to Sen, it is possible that more than one reasoned, impartial argument
may survive critical scrutiny and satisfy the demands of Rawls’s justice as fairness (Idea
10). In order to explain reasoned scrutiny’s inability to identify a single most just
outcome, Sen provides an example involving three children and a flute. In this thought
experiment, three different children all want to possess the same flute. The first child
claims the flute should be hers because she is the only one of the three who can play the
flute. The second states the flute should be his because he is poor and does not have any
toys. Though the second child cannot play the flute, he claims that the other children
have many other toys to play with, so they do not need the flute the way he does. The
third child believes the flute should be hers because she made it and thus it has been hers
all along. According to Sen, “it is not easy to brush aside as foundationless any of the
[children’s] claims” (Idea 14). On Sen’s view each claim is founded in impartiality. As
such, each child’s claim would survive the kind of critical scrutiny Rawlsian
reasonability demands.
Of these three practical options, Sen asserts, a most just outcome cannot be
determined with the help of comparisons with Rawls’ transcendental ideal. To explain
this thought, Sen provides another thought experiment: “if we are trying to choose
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between a Picasso and a Dali, it is of no help to invoke a diagnosis (even if such a
transcendental diagnosis could be made) that the ideal picture in the world is the Mona
Lisa” (Idea 16). Sen claims that though it is tempting to rank alternatives based on their
closeness to a perfect system, that approach fails in two respects. First, Sen asserts,
ranking alternatives in comparison to a transcendental ideal fails to take into account the
“different dimensions in which objects differ” (Idea 16). Returning to the Mona Lisa
thought experiment, this notion illuminates the stylistic differences of all three paintings
that may make them incomparable. Second Sen claims that the descriptive closeness of
one option to the transcendental ideal “is not necessarily a guide to valuational
proximity” (Idea 16). Here Sen points to the fact that though a Picasso may paint a
portrait that better resembles the Mona Lisa, we may nevertheless prefer the Dali due to
some other value not provided for in the transcendental model. Taken in a political
context, Sen refers to these issues as the problem of comparative assessment and
incompleteness, respectively (Idea 70). Comparative assessment points to the issues
resulting from comparing things we value for different reasons, incompleteness the fact
that our ideal may not possess a factor that we may nevertheless value in non-ideal
circumstances.
Ultimately Sen rejects Rawlsian transcendentalism due to its procedural inability
to elucidate a single most just option and its failure to use transcendental comparisons as
a remedy to this shortcoming. Here Sen states: “If institutions have to be set up on the
basis of a unique set of principles of justice emanating from the exercise of fairness,
through the original position, then the absence of such a unique emergence cannot but hit
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at the very root of the theory” (Idea 58).
Rawls would likely agree with Sen’s assessment that there are multiple reasonable
ways to respond to Sen’s flute thought experiment. On a Rawlsian view, the fact that
there is more than one reasonable solution supports Rawls’s claim that his theory of
justice is consistent with the right kind of pluralistic society. To Rawls, the reasonability
of each child’s claim renders it sufficiently just—any one of these children could justly
claim ownership of the flute.
Yet there seems to be something deeper troubling Sen about the multiplicity of
just options offered by Rawls’s theory. For Sen there isn’t much use in having a single
notion of justice if it can give rise to so many just options. Sen asserts that in situations
like this, a degree of arbitrariness is needed to identify which argument prevails (Idea
14). Instead Sen asserts that each of these theories of justice have an equal claim at being
‘the’ just form of justice.
II. PARTIAL RANKINGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSCENDENTALISM
Given Rawlsian transcendentalism’s inability to signify which of many options is
the most just, Amartya Sen presents his theory of partial rankings as an alternative. Sen
claims just outcomes can be identified by a series of comparative rankings without
reference to a transcendental ideal. Rather than brushing aside comparative assessment
and incompleteness as inherently problematic in evaluating just outcomes, Sen embraces
this seeming uncertainty. According to Sen, comparative assessment and incompleteness
are not necessarily bad when discriminating between reasoned arguments in order to
discern the demands of justice in an actual situation (Idea 70). Sen states that practical
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matters “cannot but be about comparisons” between many valuable alternatives (Idea
400). Here Sen asserts that one does not need to reference a transcendental ideal in order
to judge whether one alternative is more or less just than another. Instead of searching
for a perfectly just option, we ought to seek to enhance justice by removing obviously
unjust elements of our societies (Idea ix).
Again, Rawls would likely agree with Sen that manifest injustice ought to be
removed from the world when possible. But, the manner in which these injustices are
discussed would be quite different depending on whether the society in question adhered
to Senian or Rawlsian public reason. In a Rawlsian society citizens could only discuss
whether a situation or action is just when compared to the political conception of justice.
In a Senian society, however, citizens are free to express their own reasonable versions of
justice. Though these same citizens could express themselves in a Rawlsian public
sphere, they would not be encouraged to bring in their personal doctrines of truth or right.
Yet for Sen, the fact that distinct yet equally good views all identify an act or policy as
unjust strengthens the magnitude of its injustice.
Sen echoes this sentiment in his defense of incompleteness’s acceptability in
social assessment. Here Sen emphasizes the “urgency of removing manifest cases of
injustice” in the world rather than seeking to create a perfectly just world (Idea 70).
According to Sen, the transcendental incompleteness of a theory does not preclude
arbitrators from reaching an agreement on what ought to be done based on the relative
rankings of many options compared only with each other (Idea 105). In this argument,
Sen asserts that human beings are able to cope with determining what to do in situations
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in which values cannot necessarily be reduced to one particular ‘good’. On Sen’s view,
philosophers like Rawls are more “comfortable with counting (‘is it more or less?’)
[than]...with judgment (‘is this more important than the other’)?” (Idea 395). According
to Sen, reducing justice to one variable discounts citizens’ abilities to make judgments
across multiple seemingly irreconcilable valuations. Sen claims his idea of partial
rankings is superior to Rawls’s singular idea of justice in that it allows for considerations
across many dimensions.
On the surface Sen’s partial rankings appear very much like Rawls’s overlapping
consensus. Both models focus on commonalities in citizens’ ideologies to arrive at just
solutions. Yet partial rankings are different than overlapping consensus in two important
ways. First, while Rawlsian justice centers on making positive claims that build up
justice, Sen’s partial rankings result in negative claims tearing down injustice. This
difference may not seem particularly significant, but these two paradigms embody
strikingly different orientations toward justice. Partial rankings provide a sense of
forward motion and concrete strides toward eliminating injustice while a Rawlsian
transcendental view sets an impossible standard which may lead to greater feelings of
inadequacy or defeatism. Moreover, though Sen values impartiality and reasonability,
the incompleteness of a system of partial rankings leaves room to include a wider range
of viewpoints than Rawls’s consensus based on completeness.
On the other hand, one might critique Sen’s partial rankings as defeatist in
abandoning the kind of ‘realistic utopia’ Rawls strives for in his political philosophy
(Theory 4). Yet according to Sen the insistence “that we must have agreed complete
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orderings or universally accepted full partitions of the just, strictly separated from the
unjust” is naive. Moreover, Sen claims Rawls’s idealism is not constructive in fulfilling
the actually achievable goal of creating a more just world (Idea ix, 26). Sen explains this
concept by stating:
When people across the world agitate to get more global justice - and I emphasize
here the comparative word ‘more’ - they are not clamouring for some kind of
‘minimal humanitarianism’. Nor are they agitating for a ‘perfectly just’ world
society, but merely for the elimination of some outrageously unjust arrangements
to enhance global justice, as Adam Smith, or Condorcet or Mary Wollstonecraft
did in their own time, and on which agreements can be generated through public
discussion, despite a continuing divergence of views on other matters. (Idea 26)
On Sen’s view it is extremely important that we spend our energy and resources making
the world a better place for those who presently live in it rather than striving to create a
set of perfectly just institutions. In this way, combining Senian partial rankings with a
partial public political sphere allows us to eliminate injustice while respecting individuals
and providing opportunities for outsiders to dismantle politically powerful ideologies.
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5. Compassion and the (Im)Partial Spectator
You are tweeting in an era three years after the fall of myspace. Act like it”
just took a Naked Shower
im going to the grocery store and buy all the foods that remind me of you
im tweeting for a better life in america, and all the other countrys
- S. Roggenbuck

My discussion of secularism and public reason explored how open partiality is not
only possible, but may actually improve the quality of public discourse in pluralistic
societies. Our ability to intimately understand others, however, might not be worth
pursuing as a good in itself. In fact, if Rawls’s philosophy is any indication, we ought to
value making reasonable normative judgments over gaining a deep understanding of
where others’ normative judgments come from. In the last chapter I explored how a
partial, pluralistic public sphere might not run contrary to Rawls’s goal of bringing about
a more just world. But what if understanding others’ personal doctrines might even help
us persuade them that our conception of justice is preferable to theirs?
In this section I will discuss the more strategic reasons why we ought to support
open partiality. First I will explain legal sociologist Erich Steinman’s theory of
‘institutional entrepreneurship’ as a mode of creating political change. After discussing
Steinman’s work I will relate it to Martha Nussbaum’s emphasis on contextual emotion
in her new work Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. After exploring
cultural insiders’ unique ability to create lasting societal change I will discuss the role
outsiders might play in this model. Here I will draw on Adam Smith’s ‘impartial
spectator’ as it functions in Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Amartya Sen’s
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The Idea of Justice. I will conclude that cultural spectators play an important role in
changing cultural norms. Yet, I will state that spectators ought to be just that—
spectators—in this change process. I will end by asserting that an uninhibited public
political sphere is more effective than a reasonable public political sphere in bringing
about the kinds of normative changes Rawls hopes for.
I will begin with an example. In the Gelug-pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism, monks
are regarded as particularly valuable individuals due to their knowledge of spiritual texts
and ability to bring good fortune to their communities (Kapstein 219). Within the
monastic community, there are various levels of achievement. The highest level of
monastic achievement in the Gelug-pa sect is signified by the title ‘geshe’. Geshe
degrees are awarded when monks complete over a decade of highly regimented studies in
Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and pass an exam composed of a series of debates with their
peers and highly realized Gelug-pa masters (Kapstein 224). While Tibetan nuns also
study philosophical texts, their studies are traditionally spent memorizing texts rather
than analyzing them. Until very recently, Tibetan nuns were not permitted to take geshe
examinations (Kapstein 200, Tsomo 120).
Direct movements toward giving nuns the option to become geshes, or geshemas
as the nun’s title is currently articulated, began in the 1990s. How the story goes from
there, however, depends on whom you ask. According to one perspective, Western
women’s actions were a major contributing factor to Tibetan women becoming
geshemas. From sharing normative ideas about gender to funding and founding
revolutionary new nunneries to participating in monastic study, Western women were at
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the forefront of the movement for Tibetan women (Butler 138, Dongyu, Mandala).
Geshe Kelsang Wangmo-la, a German woman, became ordained as a nun in the early
1991 and went on to become the first female geshe in April 2011 (Mandala). In fact,
Geshe Kelsang Wangmo-la may be the only woman that will ever receive the title ‘geshe’
rather than ‘geshema’. According to this narrative, the geshema degrees awarded to
Tibetan nuns in the past year would not have been possible without Western women
paving the way.
But, that is just one side of the story. While the factual events of the narrative I
just described are true, Tibetan’s nuns’ success is a bit more nuanced. At about the same
time that now Geshe Kelsang Wangmo-la began her studies, sister-in-law to His Holiness
the 14th Dalai Lama Rinchen Khandro-la created the Tibetan Nun’s Project. The Nun's
Project was dedicated to providing destitute nuns not only with adequate shelter and
security, but also with a serious monastic education. A Western woman organized
international support and Khandro-la began the work of bringing nuns top teachers and
working with the Tibetan institutions and political figures that award geshe degrees to
create a more level playing field for the nuns (Tibetan Nuns). Here, collaboration was
crucial to Tibetan nuns becoming geshemas. Arguably, the most important part of this
collaboration was not the Western woman’s work, but Khandro-la’s. Without Khandrola’s cultural sensitivity and insider knowledge, the project may very well have been a
flop. Though it may have taken longer, Khandro-la likely could have made geshema
degrees happen for Tibetan nuns without Napper. Yet the reverse is probably not true.
Legal sociologist Erich Steinman expresses the centrality of insider perspectives
77

to creating legal change in his work on Native American sovereignty laws in Washington
state. In “Legitimizing American Indian Sovereignty” (2005) Steinman examines how a
group of Native American tribe leaders successfully harnessed legal and extra-legal
resources to improve tribal rights in Washington. What’s most interesting about
Steinman’s research is that this group of tribe leaders was able to work from within
unenforced federal laws and cultural norms to achieve an historic recognition of Native
American sovereignty (Steinman 759). In a process Steinman calls institutional
entrepreneurship, Native Americans, as both rights conscious and American, were able to
change their status from passive to active political agents by exploiting contradictions in
Americans’ valuation of Native American rights and dedication to equality to their
advantage (Steinman 771). Recall my discussion of group dynamics in Chapter 3. When
insiders see a disjunction in their group’s ideology their practice of that ideology, they are
likely to intentionally violate group norms to bring the group more in line with its own
fundamental views rather than leave the group. Outsiders, however, are not likely to do
so (Packer 53). This tendency to want to reform a group provides yet another reason to
include a wide variety of perspectives in public political discourse. If many individuals
feel like respected group members, there are more people invested in making the group’s
politics the best they can be.
Reformers in the Tibetan nuns’ movement also revalorized existing institutions to
accommodate their beliefs about equality. Given their status as dedicated group
members, reformers framed nuns’ education in a way that worked within traditional
Tibetan Buddhist fundamentals. By drawing on the importance of studying dharma and
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the traditional reverence for all sentient beings in Tibetan Buddhism, Rinchen Khandro-la
and others were able to carve out a culturally appropriate path for gender equality in
Tibetan Buddhist monasticism. Not only was this reasoning difficult to argue against
from within a Tibetan philosophical perspective, the intuitive nature of these reformer’s
claims added the powerful voices of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and His Holiness
the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa to their cause (Butler 193; “The Heart”). With the support
of these highly influential figures, Tibetan Buddhist reformers striving for gender
equality effectively made their goals part of the institutions they hope to change (Ekvall
630, Houston & Wright 218).
Steinman’s institutional entrepreneurship provides a sociological basis for Martha
Nussbaum’s argument for culturally appropriate campaigns for justice in her book
Political Emotions. Nussbaum argues that the efforts of normative reformers like
Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, and
Jawaharlal Nehru were so successful due to their ability to ground their ideas in their
cultural context while critiquing it at the same time (Emotions 2-3, 14). Nussbaum looks
to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address as an exemplar in contextual critique. Drawing on basic
constitutional principles to change the way Americans think about slavery and war,
Lincoln undertook “nothing less than a refounding of America as a nation dedicated to
human equality” (Emotions 231). Though the conception of America as a nation
dedicated to human equality does not seem new or radical, applying this equality to
slaves was radical at the time. Re-interpreting American equality is an ongoing process
that continues today with reference to race, class, gender, sexuality, and a slew of other
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identities (Steinman).
According to Nussbaum, Lincoln’s appeals would not have worked in another
nation. Nor would an outsider have been able to come into the United States during the
Civil War and argue as effectively, even if that outsider had a firm grasp of American
constitutional principles. As with many other arguments, this one is hard to see from the
perspective of our own cultural ambassadors, but becomes clear when thinking about
cultures different from our own. Nussbaum makes her point best when she discusses
Tagore’s songs. While Tagore inspires idealistic pride in Indians, his highly contextual
songs will not move Americans—even if they draw on the same fundamental ideals
Americans hold dear. Beyond mere language barriers, the tradition of Indian literature
and music speaks uniquely to individuals who share in, or have intimate awareness of,
India’s culture and history (Emotions, 14).
If you are going to convince someone, then, you must rely on their cultural
assumptions, not your own. Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman” employs Christian
mythology and existing gender norms as tools to subvert how 19th century white men
think about race and gender. Importantly, Truth’s speech does more than draw on ideas
she shares with white men. Instead, Truth uses her position as both a cultural insider and
outsider to appeal to what white men value most. By focusing on what is most important
to her audience, Truth is able to illuminate how views these men already hold, like
reverence for the Virgin Mary and notions that women ought to be delicate and pure, to
promote her own identity as a woman who ought to be cared for and respected (Truth,
91).
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Rawls wants reasonable people to express their views in a way that other
reasonable people can understand. If someone can’t express themselves in this way,
reasonable people ought not to give their opinions much weight, nor should they attempt
to understand their unreasonable view in the context of political conversation. Yet each
of these examples illuminate how contextual communication is more effective in bringing
about change than dismissing those we disagree with. By communicating with others on
their grounds rather than what they deem reasonable, Rawlsian reasonable people will not
only respect others as individuals, they just might be more effective in reaching their goal
of creating more reasonable people.
If reasonable people are to have conversations with unreasonable people on their
grounds, the content of these conversations cannot be limited to reasonable matters.
Instead, emotional appeals based on comprehensive doctrines will be much more
effective. In fact, Nussbaum credits emotion with Lincoln and Tagore’s effectiveness
just as much as she credits their skillful institutional entrepreneurship (Emotions 2-3, 14,
231-4). Thinkers following in the political liberal tradition might object to the use of
emotion right off the bat. For those whose modern self-consciousness divides the world
into good and evil kinds of doctrines, cultivating political emotions likely conjures
images of aggressive or fascist states. Yet according to Nussbaum, “All political
principles, the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure their stability
over time” (Emotions 3). Rawls would agree with Nussbaum that the political conception
of justice must be supported by the comprehensive doctrines individuals hold dear.
Though Nussbaum sees herself as falling squarely within Rawls’s theoretical
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framework, I see these two lines of thinking departing in their emphasis on what public
reason ought to focus on. Rawls encourages citizens to discuss the content of ideas they
already reached a consensus about through the lens of language they all already seem to
agree on. Nussbaum, on the other hand, encourages citizens to grapple with the
disparities between their viewpoints. Rather than limiting political conversations to what
is reasonable, Nussbaum’s project encourages disagreement followed by attempts to
understand and relate to those who do not share our point of view. In fact, Nussbaum
looks to World War II as evidence that we must explicitly employ emotions in the public
sphere rather than allowing these persuasive techniques to be the domain of fascist
dictators. By failing to utilize appeals firmly rooted in particular comprehensive
doctrines political liberals cannot compete with ideologies employed by their adversaries
(Emotions 222).
Just as in her discussion of contextual change, however, Nussbaum states that
public emotion must be attentive to the place, time, and culture of any given society
(Emotions 381). For Nussbaum, it is the emotions involved that make cultural context so
important. Different histories lead to different comprehensive doctrines which, in turn,
lead to different emotional responses. It is these emotions that make it so that cultural
insiders are better at explaining the same content to a group than cultural outsiders. This
insider privilege is why Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King Jr. are better suited to
convince Americans of an evolving notion of equality than Tagore or Nehru would be.
But if cultural insiders are best at changing others’ minds, what is the role of
outsiders? Would it even be worth a Rawlsian reasonable person’s time to try to talk to
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an unreasonable person? There are many answers to these questions. First, culture is not
the same as a comprehensive doctrine. Two individuals with the same cultural
background could have disparate comprehensive doctrines. In this way, a Rawlsian
reasonable person could draw on cultural elements an unreasonable person may adhere to
in order to craft an argument that might persuade the unreasonable person. Moreover,
just as Nussbaum indicated that an American could come to appreciate Tagore’s music
over time, so too could individuals learn about each other’s comprehensive doctrines in
order to make arguments from within them (Emotions 100). This is only possible,
however, if comprehensive doctrines are fair content in political discussions.
Moreover, just because social and political movements work best when
administered by insiders with intimate knowledge of how to navigate their culture does
not mean outsiders ought to stay out of the picture altogether. As we saw in the Tibetan
nun’s movement, outsiders may be an important source of normative ideas, even if they
aren’t in the best position to implement them in a particular society. In this example,
outsiders were best suited to provide commentary and alternative arguments while
leaving the work of implementing new normative ideas to cultural insiders.
In Rawls’s conception, there isn’t room for ideological outsiders. Amartya Sen,
however, claims public spheres ought to include outsiders as informants in political
discourse. Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009) draws heavily on Adam Smith’s impartial
spectator as detailed in Smith’s the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). According to
Smith, spectators’ detachment from political issues gives them a unique clarity on how
foreign political questions ought to be handled (Smith 27). Nussbaum and Steinman’s
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arguments indicate that spectators are not in the best position to make political decisions,
particularly decisions regarding implementing new normative ideas.
Smith states that any act that “every indifferent person would rejoice to see
executed” ought to be carried out (Smith 27). For Sen, however, the impartial spectator’s
opinion carries less weight. Sen asserts that there isn’t one version of justice that is
superior to any other in the public sphere.11 Due to the lack of inherent superiority of any
one viewpoint, every political doctrine ought to be included in public reason. Sen’s view
does not indicate that an outside view is necessarily better but rather asserts that outside
viewpoints might be relevant “either because their interests are involved, or because their
ways of thinking about these issues throw light on particular judgments—a light that
might be missed in the absence of giving those perspectives an opportunity to be aired”
(Idea 44).
Of course, the impartial spectator is not actually impartial. Though spectators
may be removed from the cultural, social, and political contexts of an issue, it is just as
important to recognize their positionality as it is to recognize the positionality of cultural
insiders. As I stated earlier, inescapable positionality does not preclude individuals from
having or expressing legitimate arguments in the public sphere. Rather positionality
ought to be taken into account, explored, and, when necessary, critiqued.
Both Sen and Smith point to the impartial spectator’s partiality in their respective
works. For example, part of the reason Sen thinks the spectator’s opinion is important is

11

Sen’s work relies heavily on a Rawlsian notion of reasonability. Sen states that no one
reasonable version of justice is superior to any other reasonable version of justice. I have already
discussed this issue at length and reject reasonability as a way to classify political doctrines.
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exactly because they come from a different tradition of situated knowledge (Idea 45).
Smith, on the other hand, values the spectator’s ideological particularity because it draws
on the kinds of emotions I mentioned earlier. According to Smith, it is the spectator’s
emotional response that causes them to become interested in other communities’ political
issues to begin with. On Smith’s view every human being has a capacity for compassion,
making it a prime way to motivate persons to act. In fact, Smith thinks compassion’s
universal hold on persons is so obvious that it does not require any kind of explanation or
proof (Smith 3). Dawes echoes this sentiment. Though Dawes doesn’t state that
compassion is universal, he indicates that compassion “doesn't need to be natural,
neurally programmed, or God-given to have force” we can harness to create change
(Dawes 198).
Nussbaum shares Smith and Dawes’s affinity for compassion as a political
motivator, though she does not share Smith’s dismissal of the need to explain or prove
compassion’s hold on persons. According to Nussbaum, compassion is defined by four
factors: seriousness, nonfault, similar possibilities, and eudaimonistic thought.
Nussbaum states that persons only feel compassion when they take another’s suffering to
be substantial, important and not chosen or self-inflicted. Moreover, a person feeling
compassion often does so because they think the suffering person is in some way similar
to themselves and shares vulnerabilities with themselves. Lastly Nussbaum thinks
compassion is usually felt when the person feeling compassion takes the other’s suffering
to be important not only to the sufferer, but also to themselves. On Nussbaum’s view, all
major emotions are eudaimonistic in that they focus on persons’ most valued goals and
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projects. While seriousness and nonfault are essential to compassion, Nussbaum states,
similar possibilities and eudaimonistic thought are not required in every instance of
compassionate emotion (“Compassion” 234-6, Emotions 142-144). Yet it is these latter
two, especially eudaimonistic thought, that compels outsiders to take an interest in the
political well-being of others. For this reason, compassion ought to be included as an
important and legitimate motivator for spectators to enter into others’ public spheres.
Nussbaum recognizes that compassion, like political emotions generally, may not
be trusted by political liberals. Instead political liberals, following in the western secular
tradition will likely assert that “impartial motives based on ideas of dignity and respect”
ought to determine entrance into the public sphere of another (“Compassion” 231).
Nussbaum worries, however, that respect is not a substantial enough motivator to bring
persons to action in the political realm. Here Nussbaum draws on Aristotle’s critique of
Plato’s Republic. According to Aristotle, impartial motives do not carry the kind of
urgency necessary to motivate persons to take responsibility for others. Emotional
responses and eudaimonistic ties, however, cause persons to feel a greater sense of duty
toward those around them (“Compassion” 232, 241-2). “Without these,” Nussbaum
states, “the public culture remains wafer-thin and passionless, without the ability to
motivate people” (Emotions 43). Smith agrees. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith
states that persons most basic obligation is to act according to a compassion-based justice
(Smith 114). By drawing on this duty we can encourage spectators and citizens alike to
bring their disparate personal and political doctrines into the public sphere to participate
in a rich public reason aimed at resolving political issues. We cannot, however, do so in
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a Rawlsian public sphere. Rawlsian reasonability does not leave room for spectators or
the kind of personal doctrine-dependent material that would inspire spectators to act.
Yet compelling individuals to act on compassion is not always ideal. For
example, compassion may be misplaced causing a spectator to attempt to fix a situation
that was better left alone. Or, even when compassion rightly identifies injustice, how
spectators might attempt to remedy this injustice may only exacerbate the problem. More
than that, however, spectator’s compassion carries with it its own set of ethical
considerations. As Smith alluded, compassion is a particularly good motivator because
of its centrality to people’s lives. Nussbaum takes Smith’s assertion one step further.
According to Nussbaum compassion, in its most compelling form, is eudaimonistic.
Here a eudaimonistic emotion is one that is based on an individual person’s take on what
it means to flourish (Emotions 11).
Compassion’s eudaimonistic quality presents two issues for Nussbaum. First,
compassion causes persons to equate others’ life purposes with their own. We feel
compassion when we see another person somehow missing out on the kind of life we
value, not necessarily when they are unable to achieve the kind of life they want for
themselves (“Compassion” 230). By identifying this similarity we run the risk of
reducing the other’s action-worthiness to their similarity to ourselves rather than their
own intrinsic value. Smith echoes this sentiment. According to Smith, we cannot
entirely sympathize with another without approving of their feelings as suitable and
consistent with our own (Smith 14-15).
Our need to identify with the other to feel the kind of compassion that will propel
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us to act brings us to Nussbaum’s second worry about eudaimonia: the ‘circle of
concern’. If someone is going to demand our attention, Nussbaum claims, our sense of
well-being must be somehow damaged by another’s suffering. “If distant people and
abstract principles are to get a grip on our emotions, therefore, these emotions must
somehow position them within our circle of concern, creating a sense of ‘our’ life in
which these people and events matter as parts of...our own flourishing” (Emotions 11).
Yet how does a remote person or event become an essential part of our individual
eudaimonistic concerns? According to Dawes the answer lies in our understanding of
these persons or events as individuals themselves. While bystanders are less likely to be
moved by anonymous appeals like objective reports and statistics, they are more likely to
respond to outsiders’ needs or claims when their identity is recognizable (Dawes 121). In
a study published by Australia’s Victoria Law Foundation last year, Rachel Ball the
Human Rights Law Center Director of Advocacy and Campaigns conducted a series of
interviews with individuals involved in research and advocacy in a range of legal and
rights-based organizations around the world. Ball found that personal “stories are central
to effective advocacy”. More than just raising awareness, however, Ball claims
“empathy and understanding lead to better advocacy outcomes” (Ball 12). Ball’s
informants claim emotional appeals bring about better policies because the kind of
evidence they illicit portrays the complexity and humanity behind rights issues—a
complexity and humanity that often gets left out of cold, hard stats and other ‘serious’
information (Ball 12-13). Rawlsian reasonability is not simply an ineffective mode of
communication and orientation toward justice. The Rawlsian public sphere might
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actually keep out information critical to making decisions about justice.
Storytelling is nothing new in human rights work. In fact, according to Lynn
Hunt, storytelling was what spurred the human rights movement in the first place. Hunt
claims social and political change happen as the result of persons perceiving that they
have had similar experiences. Human rights as a change in social and political ideology
came about when persons perceived that they all had something in common—humanity.
Though persons’ common humanity might seem obvious now, Hunt claims this idea did
not gain widespread acceptance in the West until epistolary novels entered the scene in
the 18th Century. Novels allowed persons to view others in a whole new light. By
reading literary characters, persons were able to gain an intimate glimpse into the lives of
remote individuals they might never otherwise have access to. Echoing Nussbaum’s
‘similar possibilities’ requirement for compassion, Hunt states that a critical element in
this intimacy is the act of imagination where the reader inserts themselves into the
character they are reading, empathizing with a character who is at once self and other.
This act of insertion was particularly powerful with characters that were radically
different from themselves. For the first time upper class men were able to imagine
themselves as women or their drivers. Through reading individuals came to the
conclusion that all persons, no matter what their gender or social class, shared in an
equality of interior emotions (Hunt 34, 40, 55, 59-60) In order for these stories to be
taken seriously in the political sphere, however, we must have a political culture that
values partial, personal stories rather than dismissing them as inadequate or overly-biased
evidence. Before this can happen we must craft a public sphere that is respectful and
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trusting of others’ partial views.
Yet Hunt’s assertion that the reader inserts themselves in the character in some
way brings us right back to Nussbaum’s worries about eudaimonistic emotions. Dawes’s
Evil Men also raises several objections to using compassion as a basis for action. First,
Dawes asserts that while altruistic responses to others’ hardship helps others, it also
involves self-serving interests to meet one’s own needs, and, as Nussbaum would say,
further one’s own goals (Dawes xii). Dawes worries that in addition to replacing the
other with our own interests as an extension of ourselves, we may begin to see the objects
of our compassion as just that—objects. For Dawes, the danger of seeing victims of
injustice “exclusively through their experience of pain” has the power to be just as
dehumanizing as replacing them with our own interests (Dawes 213).
The paradoxical relationships between persons feeling compassion and the object
of their compassion are complex and ought not to be dismissed outright. Yet perhaps
these offenses may admit of degrees depending upon the scale of spectators’ actions.
Recall my claim that institutional changes—particularly cultural ones—come best from
within. On my view, spectators’ roles are not to enact change, but rather to introduce
new ideas into remote public spheres or encourage others to do so. If so-called-others are
not subject to paternalistic constraints as to which ideas they incorporate or how they
choose to do so, spectators’ involvement may be less commandeering and more
respectful.
Dawes also worries about the effectiveness of compassionate storytelling as a
strategy for getting spectators’ attention. According to Dawes overloading spectators
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with stories of grave injustices could lead to what he calls ‘story fatigue’, not action.
Story fatigue is a phenomenon whereby spectators become overwhelmed by the amount
of injustice in the world and choose to tune out compassion-evoking stories rather than
allowing themselves to be drawn in to them (Dawes 12). Dawes’s concern lies not only
in how spectators might tune out far-off concerns, but also in their ability to
compassionately respond to crises in their own communities. Dawes writes:
Perhaps empathy isn’t so much like a muscle that can be trained as capital that
can be overspent. We spend our empathy on war photographs, or on fictional
people, caring anxiously for them and leaving nothing for those whose lives we
can actually touch. (Dawes 209)
Though the risk of story fatigue is certainly concerning, it may be a risk we have to take
in pursuit of a more just world. Just as my position encourages an openly partial public
sphere, the same sort of self-awareness ought to be employed in how individuals chose to
act upon compassionate responses to others.
Here we are presented with a paradox. On the one hand, compassion may be the
best way to propel spectators to offer their opinions in the public sphere. Spectators play
a critical role in introducing new perspectives into public discourse. On the other hand,
compassion might reduce the other to an extension of ourselves, or even ignore
individuals’ sufferings we perceive as not similar enough to our own. According to
Nussbaum we must rely on compassion despite its difficulties because, well, it’s the best
vehicle we have to connect outsiders to peoples’ suffering. But where ought we draw the
line? How far ought spectators take their compassionate desire to relinquish injustice?
Given spectator’s tendency to essentialize the other and act in inappropriate ways, it
might be best if spectators merely express their views without acting on them in a foreign
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culture. Recall Tibetan nuns’ success in obtaining support from the Tibetan community
in their pursuit to take geshe examinations. The Tibetan nuns’ eventual success was
rooted in a negotiation between their position as cultural insiders in the Tibetan
community and their access to outside ideas.
It’s hard to believe that merely accessing spectators’ ideas will bring about
meaningful change. But Solomon Asch’s social conformity experiments tell a different
story. In the experiments, participants were placed in a room with a group of actors
whom the participant believed were fellow participants. All of the people in the room
were asked to compare a series of lines’ lengths. While it was obvious which lines’
lengths matched, the actors in the group were frequently asked to identify matching sets
incorrectly. Asch found that participants would echo the group’s obviously false
responses roughly 3 out of four times. The Asch experiments indicate that people who
dissent from group sentiments may remain silent and complicit in group dialogues. In
fact, Rawls counts on this very same phenomenon to transform unreasonable people into
reasonable ones by coming into contact with a political culture dominated by
reasonability. But, when just one other person dissented from the group’s incorrect
responses, Asch’s participants answered incorrectly 75% less of the time than they did
without the ‘truth-teller’. Participant’s answers continued to depart from group
sentiments even after the ‘truth-teller’ left the room (Asch 177-190, Dawes 56, Emotions
192). Asch’s participants’ confidence in expressing their contradictory views when
supported by just one other person indicates that remote spectators’ ideas might have the
power to encourage dissenters to express their views.
92

By introducing or supporting dissenting ideas, spectators play a critical role in the
shape of the public sphere and the kids of partial rankings and just outcomes that might
come out of it. Of course, these exchanges cannot happen when interaction between
insiders and spectators is cut off or seriously jeopardized. Drawing on Kant Nussbaum
claims that a “strong legal protection” of freedoms of speech, dissent, and the press are
foundational to compassionate discourse (Emotions 256). While Nussbaum’s work
focuses on domestic policies, the sentiment can be expanded to global cross-cultural
discourse reminiscent of Kant’s work in Perpetual Peace.
More than just removing institutional barriers, however, political culture ought to
encourage persons to express partial views not supported by the majority. If political
discourse is limited to a particular set of views and a particular way of expressing them,
new ideas will likely be excluded from the set of legitimate views. Substantially
including dissenting opinions does not mean a political culture must be “neutral or
halfhearted about its own core values” (Emotions 389). According to Nussbaum, the
majority’s views could only threaten freedom of expression by suppressing divergent
opinions. Nussbaum is right to claim that political cultures ought to stand for something
(Emotions 391). Yet her vision of suppression might be different than my own. It seems
Nussbaum’s views would align with Rawls’s in that active suppression is the only kind of
condemnable act a majority could commit. If members of a dominant political culture do
not recognize their positionality, however, they may suppress dissenters by simply
ignoring them. Nussbaum claims we ought to “invite, not coerce” persons to our
perspective (Emotions 388). As we have seen throughout this paper, extending a genuine
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invitation involves respecting other points of view as legitimate claims to truth. Only
when others feel they are being taken seriously can we include them in a conversation
that they, in turn, will take seriously.
Asking the political culture to change so drastically from a polarized, suppressive
environment where persons listen to their ideas bounce in echo chambers to an openly
partial compassionate discourse will take time and considerable effort and selfawareness. This is not to say that such a goal is unworthy of our time and attention.
Particularly given the possibilities such open partiality produces to negotiate justice over
time, societies with adequate freedom of expression ought to work toward incorporating
spectators’ views into their political discussions, whether those spectators come from
near or far cultural, ideological, or geographic positions. Open partiality in the political
sphere is also important due to the political sphere’s ability to constitute the rules of
discourse in all spheres of public and personal life. As we saw in the first chapter,
persons in positions of political power determine what is reasonable in a given society.
The coercive force of institutionally legitimated ideologies gives us good reason to ensure
that free expression is protected from institutional restriction as much as possible.
While it is important to focus on cultivating open partiality, freedom of
expression necessary as a precondition to this paradigm is far more urgent. Without this
freedom of expression, insiders will not be motivated to share their stories and spectators
will not have the opportunity to feel compassion, let alone express their views in a forum
where insiders might access them. Each of these processes are critical to bringing about
justice and successfully introducing human rights into a society in a culturally
94

appropriate, sustainable manner without asking societies to reinvent the wheel over and
over again.
Freedom of expression must come first in a line of reforms aimed at making
societal or cultural groups’ ethical norms more in line with our own. Once domestic and
international freedom of expression is instituted, societies have access to all the ethical
discourse the world has to offer. Moreover, citizens can share their thoughts and
opinions among themselves, and with the outside world. Here citizens can contribute to
forming other’s ethical ideas and can benefit from spectators commenting on their own
norms. In this way, we ought to value freedom of expression not only for its key role in
respecting persons and deliberative democracies. Instead of relying on these two
common justifications of uninhibited public spheres, we ought to look at our reasons for
valuing respectful discourse. If we examine the root of our affinity for freedom of
expression I believe we will find the kind of cross-cultural change I detailed in this
chapter. We value the public sphere not as a good in itself but rather as a stepping stone
in creating a more just world. The road to bringing about the kind of public political
sphere I envision will be a rocky one. Yet, like Rawls’s realistic utopia, I claim that my
vision of a political discourse where individuals express their partial views and are open
to others’ partiality is worth striving for, even if we never actually reach the finish line.
In conclusion, I would like to state the obvious. This paper too is partial, rooted
in various comprehensive doctrines, and ought to be taken as a mere contribution to the
discussion on how we might best frame public discourse. I encourage you, the reader, to
question my assumptions, tear apart my views, and offer new solutions. In fact, the spirit
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of this paper asks nothing less.
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